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Gersovitz (1981) to match features of the data. In this model, bonds’ values can be
diluted. Second, we present a model in which sovereign bonds contain a covenant
promising that after each time the government borrows it pays to the holder of each
bond issued in previous periods the difference between the bond market price that
would have been observed absent current-period borrowing and the observed market
price. This covenant eliminates debt dilution by making the value of each bond
independent from future borrowing decisions. We quantify the effects of dilution
by comparing the simulations of the model with and without borrowing-contingent
payments. We find that dilution accounts for 84% of the default risk in the baseline
economy. Similar default risk reductions can be obtained with borrowing-contingent
payments that depend only on the bond market price. Using borrowing-contingent
payments is welfare enhancing because it reduces the frequency of default episodes.
ESSAYS ON SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES
by
César Sosa Padilla Araujo
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment




Professor Enrique G. Mendoza, Co-Chair
Professor Carmen M. Reinhart, Co-Chair
Professor Pablo N. D’Erasmo, Advisor
Professor Carlos A. Vegh
Professor Phillip L. Swagel
c© Copyright by
César Sosa Padilla Araujo
2012
Dedication
Para mi amor, Flopy.
Para mis otros amores Menchi, Doc, Berni, Pipo, Luli y Mamapata.
ii
Acknowledgments
I owe my gratitude to all the people who have made this thesis possible and
made my years at Maryland ones that I will always remember.
My advisors Enrique Mendoza, Carmen Reinhart and Pablo D’Erasmo pro-
vided great support and advice throughout these years. I initially started working
with Carmen and soon Enrique and Pablo became involved in my dissertation. From
them I learned how to do research in policy relevant issues with academic rigor and
honesty. The three of them devoted many hours (on and off campus) in listening
to me, discussing my progress and reading my drafts. Additionally, Carmen and
Enrique provided financial support through their own research grants. The way I
see economics has for ever been shaped by their example. I am immensely grateful
to them. I wish I had better words to thank them, I just hope they know how much
their support meant to me.
I thank Carlos Vegh for generously being part of my committee and also for
insightful discussions about my research at earlier stages. Phillip Swagel gratefully
accepted the invitation to be in my dissertation committee and I would like to thank
him as well.
I also received valuable input from other faculty members at Maryland during
workshop presentations and also at office meetings. For that I am thankful to Sanjay
Chugh, Rafael Dix-Carneiro, Allan Drazen, Anton Korinek, and John Rust.
Many institutions provided both financial and scientific support during the
process of my dissertation. The Department of Economics at UMD provided finan-
iii
cial support for five years. The Research Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond hosted me during the 2009 summer providing not only financial support
but also an stimulating environment from which I benefited extensively. The Amer-
ica’s center at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta hosted me during the summer of
2010: the center gave me generous resources and Stephen Kay and Federico Mandel-
man were very welcoming and supportive of my research during my time in Atlanta.
The Research Department at the International Monetary Fund was my residence
during the summer of 2011: I benefited a lot from my discussions with Giovanni
Favara and Rex Ghosh. Finally, the IMF Institute hosted me several times between
2010 and 2011 when I visited and worked on what is today the third chapter of my
dissertation. To all of these people and institutions I am greatly thankful.
I want to also express my gratitude to my co-authors Juan Carlos Hatchondo
and Leonardo Martinez. I learned a lot from them: they listened patiently at my
research ideas and were crucial in shaping my understanding of sovereign default
models. Both have proved to be great colleagues and honest friends. I look forward
to many more years of research collaboration.
My interests in economics started when I was an undergrad student at Univer-
sidad Nacional de Tucuman, in Argentina. I had many very good professors there
but Hugo Ferullo, Osvaldo Meloni, and specially Victor Elias deserve a special grat-
itude. They encouraged and helped me to go abroad and pursue graduate studies.
Victor Elias was my mentor in Tucuman and he is still a source of consultation at
every important decision in my career. My indebtness with him will never be paid
off.
iv
None of this could have been possible without the constant support of my
friends at Maryland. I had the pleasure of becoming friends (and colleagues)
with Abby Alpert, Juan Diego Bonilla, Pablo M. Federico, Teresa Fort, Carolina
Gonzalez-Velosa, Daniel Hernaiz, Gabriel Lara, Antonio Lemus, Tim Moore, Rong
Qian, Agustin Roitman, and M. Belen Sbrancia. Dani and Gabo (the ”Chateau-
boys”) proved to be true friends and great room-mates, they were my family away
from Tucuman (my hometown). Carito and Juandi were always there, through thick
and thin and together with Abby and the Chateau-boys conformed the ”Pop-Center
family”. I am very thankful to them for celebrating my successes as their owns and
always be willing to waste some time talking about nothing, or going out for dinner,
or having hours-long lunches. Pablo was also a great friend and room-mate. He
spent many hours talking about life and economics with me and I look forward to
many more. Antonio, Agustin and Rong became friends with me from the very
beginning of my time at Maryland. With them I traveled, studied, talked about re-
search and also relaxed and enjoyed life. Teresa, Tim and Belen were great friends,
I am happy to have them in my life.
Of course I want thank my family. My wife Florencia was always there... in
good times and bad. She was next to me from the early stages of my Ph. D. and
always supported me with loving patience. She believed in me before I did. My
parents (Carmen Rosa and Cesar) and my brothers (Bernardo and Augusto) loved
me in the distance and encouraged me at every step in the process. I am sure I
could never have finished without them in my life... thank you!




1.1 Sovereign Defaults and Banking Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Sovereign Defaults and Banking Crises 8
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Stylized Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.1 Timing of events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.2 Decision problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.2.1 Households’ problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.2.2 Firms’ problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.2.3 Bankers’ problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.2.4 Government Budget Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.3 Competitive Equilibrium given Government Policies . . . . . . 27
2.3.3.1 Loan Market Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3.4 Determination of Government Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.4.1 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4 Quantitative Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4.1 Functional Forms and Stochastic Processes . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4.2 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4.3.1 Output dynamics around defaults . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4.3.2 Endogenous cost of default: Credit contraction . . . 40
2.4.3.3 Benefit of defaults: reduced taxation . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4.3.4 Sovereign bonds market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4.5 Discussion of the assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3 Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk 53
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2.1 The baseline environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2.2 Recursive formulation of the baseline framework . . . . . . . . 63
3.2.3 A framework without debt dilution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.2.4 Recursive formulation of the framework without debt dilution 66
3.3 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4.1 Dilution and default risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4.2 Welfare gains from eliminating dilution . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.4.3 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
vi
3.4.4 Alternative borrowing-contingent payments . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.4.5 Borrowing-contingent payments vs. one-period bonds . . . . . 85
3.4.6 Borrowing-contingent payments vs. one-period state-contingent
claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
A Lump Sum Taxes 92
A.1 Cost vs. Benefits of a Default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
A.2 Modified Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
A.3 Quantitative Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A.3.1 Output and credit dynamics around defaults . . . . . . . . . 95
A.3.2 Sovereign Debt Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
A.3.3 Taxation around defaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
B Data Sources for Chapter 2 100
B.1 Timing of Defaults and Banking Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
B.2 Banking Sector Exposure to Government Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100





The ongoing crisis has generated a renewed attention to sovereign debt issues.
In particular the interest seems to be two-folded: on the one hand, we want to
understand the potential consequences of sovereign defaults. On the other hand,
there is also a growing interest in how to design effective mechanisms to avoid (or
dampen) these negative consequences.
This dissertation consists of two essays, each focusing on one of the above
mentioned issues. The first essay studies the relationship between sovereign de-
faults, banking sector performance and economic activity. This can therefore be
regarded as providing partial answers to the question ”what are the consequences
of a sovereign default?”. The second essay takes on the topic of debt dilution, ex-
plains how the dilution problem generates higher financing costs for sovereigns and
proposes a mechanism to ameliorate this problem. It can then be understood as a
step forward in designing mechanisms to dampen the consequences of defaults.
The remainder of this introductory chapter is as follows: the first section
overviews the analysis and results exposed in ”Sovereign Defaults and Banking
Crises” (Chapter 2), and the second section summarizes the exposition in ”Debt
Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk” (Chapter 3).
1
1.1 Sovereign Defaults and Banking Crises
Sovereign defaults and banking crises have been recurrent in emerging economies.
Recent default episodes (e.g. Russia 1998, Argentina 2001) have shown that when-
ever the sovereign decides not to repay there is an adverse impact on domestic
economies to a large extent through disruptions to the domestic financial systems.
Why does this happen? Both in the Argentine and Russian experiences the bank-
ing sectors where highly exposed to government debt. In this way a government
default directly decreased the value of the baking sector’s assets. This forced banks
to reduce credit to the domestic economy (a credit crunch) and in turn generated a
decline in economic activity.
The current debt crisis in Europe also highlights the relationship between
sovereign defaults, banking crises and economic activity. Most of the worries around
Greece’s possible default (or unfavorable restructuring) are related to the level of
exposure that banking sectors in Greece and other European countries have to Greek
debt. The concerns are not only on loosing what was invested in Greek bonds but
mostly on how this shock to banks assets will undermine their lending ability and
ultimately the economic activity as a whole.
This leads to the realization that sovereign default episodes can no longer
be understood as events in which the defaulting country suffers mainly from in-
ternational exclusion and trade punishments. The motivation above, the empirical
evidence presented later on and the policy discussions (see IMF (2002b)) make it
clear that we need to shift the attention to domestic financial sectors and how they
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channel the adverse effects of a default to the rest of the economy.
Grounded on three key regularities, namely that (i) defaults and banking crises
tend to happen together, (ii) banks are highly exposed to government debt, and (iii)
crises episodes are costly in terms of credit and output; we construct a theory that
links defaults, banking sector performance and economic activity. This chapter
provides a rationale for these phenomena by extending the traditional sovereign
default framework to incorporate bankers that lend to both the government and
the corporate sector. When these bankers are highly exposed to government debt
a default triggers a banking crisis which leads to a corporate credit collapse and
consequently to an output decline.
These dynamics that characterize a default and a banking crisis are obtained
as the optimal response of a benevolent planner: faced with a level of spending
that needs to be financed, and having only two instruments at hand (i.e. debt and
taxes), the planner may find it optimal to default on its debt even at the expense of
decreased output and consumption. The planner balances the costs and benefits of a
default: the benefit is the lower taxation needed to finance the spending (lower than
would otherwise have been necessary), the cost is the reduced credit availability and
the consequently decreased output. Quantitative analysis of a version of the model
calibrated to Argentina’s 2001 default yields the following main findings:
1. First, we obtain default in equilibrium. One may argue that this is a trivial
result given that we have a paper about defaults, but in this case it is not a
trivial outcome. Our model economy is flexible enough to capture the case in
3
which all (or a fraction of) the debt is domestically held. In this scenario the
typical reasoning in defaults models doesn’t apply: here a default does not
imply a transfer of resources from abroad. Here the ones that take the hit are
the domestic bankers. In this way a default has distributional consequences in
my model: when a default comes, bankers’ assets lose value, but at the same
time the funds that government need to raise as tax revenues decrease (due
to having walked away on the debt) and therefore the tax rate charged over
households’ labor income is also reduced.
2. Second, the model exhibits a v-shaped behavior of output and credit, as ob-
served in the data. It is important to highlight here that both the behavior of
output and credit are endogenous results of the model (in contrast to widely
assume endowment economies). Moreover it is the credit decline which gen-
erates the output decline, and this is the main (and most novel) mechanism
of the paper. One can argue that government debt has a ”liquidity” role in
our framework: it increases the available funds in the economy, and therefore
reduce the borrowing cost for firms. When defaults come, this role cannot
be performed and then borrowing costs for firms increase. This is the way in
which we obtain an endogenous cost of defaults: a default generates decreased
lending ability of the bankers, which means a contraction in the supply of
funds, which ends up with a higher borrowing cost for the corporate sector,
and an output contraction.
3. Third, on a quantitative note, the model is able to generate an output decline
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at default of roughly 9% (in deviation from trend), which is very close to the
observed 10%. This is obtained at a default frequency 1.60% and at a Mean
debt to output (16%) and mean exposure ratio (26%) matching the Argentine
evidence. Overall the model does a very good job in accounting for business
cycle regularities of Argentina and other emerging economies.
Yet another way of interpreting the contribution of this first essay is the fol-
lowing: the vast majority of the sovereign default literature has assumed exogenous
cost-of-default structures. Most of the time a predetermined fraction of output is
lost, and sometimes some exclusion from financial markets is assumed (reputational
loss). If we are to take seriously these models and their predictions, then it is a de-
sirable straightforward next step to put efforts to endogenize the costs of a default.
This is exactly what we do in the first essay, and we do it by extending the
standard sovereign default framework to incorporate bankers that lend to both the
government and the corporate sector.
1.2 Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk
This essay is joint work with Juan Carlos Hatchondo and Leonardo Martinez,
and constitutes the third chapter of the dissertation. This chapter measures the
effects of debt dilution on sovereign default risk. The debt dilution problem appears
because borrowers do not have the ability to commit to not dilute the market price
of current debt issuances with future issuances. In the essay, the price of sovereign
bond decreases (i.e., is diluted) when the government issues new bonds. If govern-
5
ments could commit to not dilute the price of current bond issuances with future
issuances, this would allow them to sell bonds at a higher price. But it is well un-
derstood that governments have limited ability to make such commitment. Thus,
dilution has received considerable attention in both academic and policy discussions.
While previous studies suggest that debt dilution may be an important source of
inefficiencies in debt markets, they do not quantify the effects of dilution.
First, the essay presents a calibrated sovereign default model (Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981)) with dilution, which matches features of the data. Second, the
essay modifies this baseline model by assuming that, when the sovereign issues debt,
it pays to the holder of each existing bond the difference between the post-issuance
bond price and the counterfactual bond price one would have observed without is-
suances. With this compensation, bond prices do not decline with debt issuances
and thus, the debt dilution problem disappears. The essay quantifies the effects of
dilution by comparing the simulations of the baseline and modified models. The
essay shows that if the sovereign could eliminate dilution, the probability of default
would decrease 84%.
The compensation used to measure dilution in our study may be difficult to
implement in reality because it is determined using a counterfactual price. However,
the essay shows that the gains from eliminating dilution could be obtained with
simpler compensation schemes that could be implemented through debt contract
covenants. For instance, most gains from eliminating dilution can be obtained by
compensating bondholders with a predetermined share of debt issuance revenues.
Furthermore, larger welfare gains can be obtained through lower default risk (at
6
the expense of higher consumption volatility) by making the compensation to bond
holders decreasing with respect to the post-issuance bond price. The analysis in this




Sovereign Defaults and Banking Crises
2.1 Introduction
Sovereign defaults and Banking Crises have been recurrent in emerging economies.
Recent default episodes (e.g. Russia 1998, Argentina 2001) have shown that when-
ever the sovereign decides not to repay there is an adverse impact on domestic
economies to a large extent through disruptions to the domestic financial systems.
Why does this happen? Both in the Argentine and Russian experiences (and also
in others discussed below) the banking sectors where highly exposed to government
debt. In this way a government default directly decreased the value of the baking
sector’s assets. This forced banks to reduce credit to the domestic economy (a credit
crunch) and in turn generated a decline in economic activity.
The current debt crisis in Europe also highlights the relationship between
sovereign defaults, banking crises and economic activity. Most of the concerns
around Greece’s possible default (or unfavorable restructuring) are related to the
level of exposure that banking sectors in Greece and other European countries have
to Greek debt. The concerns are not only on losing what was invested in Greek
bonds but mostly on how this shock to banks assets will undermine their lending
ability and ultimately the economic activity as a whole.
This leads to the realization that sovereign default episodes can no longer
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be understood as events in which the defaulting country suffers mainly from in-
ternational exclusion and trade punishments. The motivation above, the empirical
evidence presented later on and the policy discussions (see IMF (2002b)) hint to-
wards shifting the attention to domestic financial sectors and how they channel the
adverse effects of a default to the rest of the economy.
Grounded on three key regularities, namely that (i) defaults and banking crises
tend to happen together, (ii) banks are highly exposed to government debt, and (iii)
crises episodes are costly in terms of credit and output; we construct a theory that
links defaults, banking sector performance and economic activity. This chapter
provides a rationale for these phenomena by extending the traditional sovereign
default framework to incorporate bankers that lend to both the government and
the corporate sector. When these bankers are highly exposed to government debt
a default triggers a banking crisis which leads to a corporate credit collapse and
consequently to an output decline.
These dynamics that characterize a default and a banking crisis are obtained
as the optimal response of a benevolent planner: faced with a level of spending that
needs to be financed, and having only two instruments at hand (i.e. debt and taxes),
the planner may find it optimal to default on his/her debt even at the expense of
decreased output and consumption. The planner balances the costs and benefits of
a default: the benefit is the lower taxation needed to finance spending (lower than
would otherwise have been necessary), the cost is the reduced credit availability
and the subsequently decreased output. Quantitative analysis of a version of the
model calibrated to Argentina’s 2001 default yields the following main findings: (1)
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default in equilibrium, (2) v-shaped behavior of output and credit around crises
episodes, (3) mean output decline in default episodes of approximately 8%, and (4)
overall qualitative behavior of the model is in line with the business cycle regularities
observed in Argentina and other emerging economies.
Quantitative models of sovereign default have received increased attention
since the contributions of Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). These
papers extended the seminal framework of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) to account
for business cycle regularities in emerging economies. A large literature has emerged
following this approach and several interesting aspects of the dynamics of sovereign
debt have been studied recently.1 The optimal default decision examined in most
models in this literature comes from weighing the costs and benefits of default. The
majority of the literature has assumed an exogenous cost-of-default structure.2 This
chapter proposes a channel to endogenize these costs via the role of government debt
in the domestic credit market.
Mendoza and Yue (forthcoming) were the first to introduce endogenous costs
of default. They assume that a sovereign default not only excludes the government
from the international markets but also prevents the private sector firms from tap-
ping foreign markets. In this way, a sovereign default forces the productive sector to
use less efficient resources and hence generates an output cost. This chapter departs
from Mendoza and Yue (forthcoming) in two relevant ways: first, it presents a model
1Yue (2010) studies debt defaults and renegotiations, D’Erasmo (2011) incorporates government
reputation and endogenous default resolutions, Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) extend the model
to incorporate long duration bonds, Hatchondo et al. (2011) study the effects of debt dilution,
among others. Stahler (2011) presents a through account of the recent developments in this
literature.
2See, for example, Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011).
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economy flexible enough to accommodate both external and domestic debt: when
debt is at least partially domestically held default is a less attractive option (domes-
tic residents’ assets become worthless) and therefore makes default-on-equilibrium a
more challenging outcome. Second, it acknowledges the high prevalence of govern-
ment debt in banks’ balance sheets and illustrates how a sovereign default diminishes
credit availability in the economy.
Other researchers have recently and independently noticed the exposure of
the domestic banking sector to government debt and have asked different questions
about this phenomenon. Gennaioli et al. (2010) construct a stylized model of do-
mestic and external sovereign debt where domestic debt weakens the balance sheet
of banks. This potential damage suffered by the banking sector represents in itself a
‘signaling’ device that attracts more foreign lenders.3 They understand the banks’
exposure as a measure of financial institutions quality in the economy and derive
a number of testable implications that they investigate empirically. Our analysis
relates to Gennaioli et al. (2010) in that it also identifies the damage that finan-
cial institutions suffer when defaults come. We identify this reduced credit as the
endogenous mechanism generating costs of defaults and also analyze the benefits
side: how distortionary taxation changes when defaults happens. Additionally we
develop a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model that is able to account for
a number of empirical regularities in emerging economies.
Bolton and Jeanne (2011) have an interesting paper on sovereign defaults and
3Basu (2009) develops a similar model that features domestic and foreign creditors and where
domestic economic fragility allows the sovereign to borrow from international markets. Alessandro
(2009) presents a related model in which the sovereign default increases the borrowing costs to
domestic firms.
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bank fragility in a model of contagion between financially integrated economies.
With a stylized three-period model they show that financial integration without
fiscal integration may result in an inefficient (from a global perspective) supply of
government debt. This chapter relates to them in that both highlight the expo-
sure of the banking sector to government debt and that sovereign defaults generate
contractions in private credit. We depart from Bolton and Jeanne (2011) in that
their focus is mostly on advance economies and contagion among them, whereas
our chapter focuses on emerging economies. This chapter also differs on the optimal
policy treatment of the default decision and the quantitative analysis of the business
cycle behavior of models of sovereign defaults and banking.4
This chapter is also related to the optimal taxation literature. The closest
paper to ours in this literature is Pouzo (2008). He builds on the work of Aiya-
gari et al. (2002) to analyze the optimal taxation problem of a planner in a closed
economy with defaultable debt. This chapter differs from Pouzo (2008) in three
crucial aspects: first, Pouzo (2008) relies on an exogenous cost of default whereas
we propose an endogenous structure; second, Pouzo (2008) restricts the analysis to
a closed economy setting (and therefore to domestic debt) whereas the environment
to be studied here is flexible enough to accommodate both domestic and external
debt; and third (on a more technical note), Pouzo (2008) solves for an equilibrium
in which the government has commitment to a certain tax schedule but not to a
repayment policy, whereas our analysis assumes no commitment on the side of the
4Yet another related work is the one by Livshits and Schoors (2009). They argue that defaults
generate banking crises because of an inadequate prudential regulation which does not recognize
the riskiness of the debt.
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government.5
The contribution of this chapter is two-folded. First, it presents a theory
of the transition mechanism of sovereign defaults to the banking sector and the
rest of the economy. The existing literature on quantitative models of sovereign
defaults has remained silent about the relationship of sovereign debt, default and
the performance of the banking sector, this chapter fills this gap. Second, on a
methodological note, this chapter presents a competing mechanism to endogenize
the costs of sovereign defaults: a sovereign default generates a credit crunch, and
this credit crunch generates output declines.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents
stylized facts on sovereign defaults, banking crises and output and credit drops.
Section 3 lays out the model and defines the equilibrium. Section 4 contains the
numerical solution and the main results of the chapter. Section 5 has a conclusion
and describes avenues for future research.
2.2 Stylized Facts
This section documents the stylized facts that motivate the theoretical/quantitative
analysis presented in the rest of the chapter. It begins by describing the time clus-
tering of default crises and banking crises. Then, it examines the exposure of the
emerging economies’ banking sectors to government debt. Finally, it presents the
output and credit behavior around default episodes.
5This chapter is also related to the literature on optimal public policy without commitment.
These papers solve for Markov-Perfect (and therefore, time-consistent) optimal policy. See Klein
et al. (2008) and references therein.
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Default in period t
Banking Crises in:
t− 2 or t− 1 14 (36%)
t 13 (33%)
t+ 1 or t+ 2 12 (31%)
Table 2.1: Timing of Defaults and Banking Crises.
Default and Banking crises tend to happen together. We follow Rein-
hart and Rogoff (2009) classification of banking crises to identify those crises that
occurred in the temporal vicinity of a sovereign default. Of the 82 banking crises
episodes documented in Reinhart (2010), 70 were coupled with default crises.6 From
those 70 episodes we only consider crises after 1970 (due to data limitations) and we
identify those in which the sovereign default either preceded or coincided with the
banking crisis: Table 2.1 shows that this occurred in 25 out of 39 post 1970 events.7
The relationship between Banking crises and Default episodes has been pre-
viously studied in the empirical literature. In particular, the question of whether
a default causes a banking crisis or viceversa has been recently studied by Boren-
sztein and Panizza (2008). They construct an index of banking crises that includes
149 countries for the period 1975-2000. In this sample they identify 111 banking
6They follow Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) in defining as a banking crisis any episode
in which at least one of the following criteria is true: (1) The ratio of non-performing assets to
total assets in the banking system exceeds 10 percent, (2) The cost of rescue operation was at
least 2 percent of GDP, (3) Banking sector problems resulted in a large scale nationalization of
banks, (4) Extensive bank runs took place or emergency measures (e.g. deposit freezes, prolonged
bank holidays, generalized deposit guarantees) were enacted by the government. The mechanism
highlighted in this chapter is closely related to (1).
7This timing of events, with the banking crisis occuring after or at the same time as the default
event is consistent with the one we will assume in the model of the next Section, and hence the
significance of documenting that this was the timing observed in about 2/3 of the actual twin
default/banking crises.
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Unconditional Prob. of a banking crisis 2.9
Prob. of banking crisis conditional on default 14.1
p-value on the test: prob(bc/def) > prob(bc) 0.0
Unconditional Prob. of a sovereign default 2.2
Prob. of default conditional on banking crisis 4.5
p-value on the test: prob(def/bc) > prob(def) 0.1
Table 2.2: Probabilities of Defaults and Banking Crises. From Borensztein and Panizza
(2008)
crises (implying an unconditional probability of having a crisis equal to 2.9%) and
85 default episodes (unconditional default probability of 2.2%). Their results are
summarized in the Table 2.2.
When conditioning on a sovereign default episode, the probability of a bank-
ing crisis increases by a factor of 5 and this conditional probability is statistically
significant from the unconditional one (as denoted by a 0.0 p-value).
It can be argued that a banking crises can generate additional government
spending (for example in the form of bailouts) that would make the sovereign more
prone to a default. It is then imperative to examine the probability of having
a default conditional on experiencing a banking crisis: this probability is only 2
percentage points higher than the unconditional probability and it is not statistically
significant (at either the 1% and the 5% confidence levels) from the unconditional
one.8
8A more recent empirical study on banking crises and sovereign defaults is the one by Balteanu
et al. (2011). Using the date of sovereign debt crises provided by Standard & Poor’s and the sys-
temic banking crises identified in Laeven and Valencia (2008) they end up with a sample containing
121 sovereign defaults and 131 banking crises for 117 emerging and developing countries from 1975
to 2007. Among them they identify 36 ”twin crises” (defaults and banking crises): in 17 of them
a banking crisis preceded the sovereign default and in 19 the reverse was true.
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Figure 2.1: Banking Sector exposure to Gov’t debt.
Even tough these results should be taken with a grain of salt, they suggest
that a default may increase the probability of a banking crisis much more then the
other way around. Overall, the evidence presented provides support for the assumed
timing in the model.
The banking sector exposure to government debt. In this section we
take a look at the degree of exposure of banks to government debt.9 To do this we
follow Kumhof and Tanner (2005) and define an exposure ratio in the following way:
Financial Institutions’ net credit to the gov’t
Financial Institutions’ net total assets
As Figure 2.1 documents, this exposure ratio averages 30% for emerging economies.
What is even more compelling is that for countries that actually defaulted (like
Russia and Pakistan) this percentage was even higher.
9Between 2001 and 2002 in Argentina, considerations on the harm the banking system would
take were in the front row of the discussions that eventually lead to the default decision. See Perry
and Servén (2003) and Kumhof (2004).
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Output Costs of Defaults after 1970




















Figure 2.2: Costly Defaults and Banking Crises.
Crises episodes are episodes of decreased output and credit. It has
been documented that output falls sharply in the event of a sovereign default (see
for example Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005)). Figure 2.2 makes the same point
in a visual way. We observe a v-shape behavior of GDP in the temporal vicinity of
defaults.
Default and banking crises are also characterized by decreased credit to the
private sector. To document this fact we use the Financial Structure Dataset con-
structed by Beck et al. (2009) to look at the behavior of Private credit by deposit
money banks and other financial institutions around defaults and banking crises.
Figure 2.3 plots this measure as a percentage of GDP and shows that when a de-
fault comes private credit shrinks and remains reduced for the subsequent periods.
To summarize the set of facts just reviewed: (1) Default and Banking crises
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Private Credit around Defaults
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Figure 2.3: Private Credit.
tend to happen together (with 64% of banking crises happening together with or
right after a default), (2) the banking sector is highly exposed to government debt
(with emerging economies banking sector holding on average 30% of their assets in
government bonds), and (3) crises episodes are episodes of decreased output and
credit.
2.3 Environment
We analyze a closed economy under discrete time. There are four players in
this economy: households, firms, bankers, and a (benevolent) government. In this
framework the households do not have any intertemporal choice so they only make
two decisions: how much to consume and how much to work (i.e., this is just a
consumption/leisure problem from the households’ point of view). The production
18
in the economy is conducted by standard neoclassical firms that face only a working
capital constraint: they need to pay a fraction of the wage bill up-front, hence their
need for external financing.
The bankers lend to both firms and government from a pool of funds available
to them each period. These bankers start the period with two assets: A and b.
A represents an exogenous endowment that the bankers receive every period.10 b
represents the level of sovereign debt owned by the bank at the beginning of the
period (this was optimally chosen in the previous period).
Finally, the government is a benevolent one (i.e., it tries to maximize the resi-
dents’ utility). It faces a stream of spending that must be financed and it has three
instruments to do so: labor income taxation, borrowing, and default. We do not
assume any kind of commitment technology available to the government: this means
that every period the government can default on its debt. This default decision is
taken at the beginning of the period and influences the rest of the economic deci-
sions. Therefore the following subsections examine how this economy works under
both default and no-default, and ultimately how the sovereign optimally chooses its
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Figure 2.4: Timing of events.
2.3.1 Timing of events
The timing of events for a government that starts period t in good credit
standing (i.e., not excluded from the credit market) is illustrated in Figure 2.4 and
it proceeds as follows:
• Period t arrives:
1. zt (the TFP shock) is observed.
2. Given that the government is not excluded from the credit market the
pay-off relevant state variables are the level of debt and the level of the
10There are a number of ways to interpret this endowment A. One alternative is to model
deposits dynamics, then A is composed of fresh deposits received by the bankers in period t. An
alternative interpretation is that bankers are part of the household, and they are the only ones
capable of conducting financial transactions, then it is optimal for the household (at the beginning
of the period) to give this endowment A to the members of the household that will use it better:
the bankers. Yet another interpretation is to think of the bankers as ”international banks”: A
represents the flow of funds from the parent bank to its subsidiary.
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TFP shock: (bt, zt). We are in node A
3. The government makes the default decision: dt ∈ {0, 1}
(a) if default is chosen (dt = 1) we move to the lower branch of the tree
and the following happens:
i. government gets excluded and the credit market consists of only
the (intra-period) loan market: firms borrow to meet the working
capital constraint and bankers lend (ls) up to the level of their
endowment (A).
ii. firms repay principal plus interests (ls(1 + r)) and all other mar-
kets (labor and goods) clear.
iii. taxation (τ) and consumption take place.
iv. at the end of period t a re-access lottery is played: with proba-
bility φ the government will re-access next period and get a fresh
start (b′ = 0) and with probability 1 − φ the government will
remain excluded and will start next period in node B .
(b) if repayment is chosen (dt = 0) we move to the upper branch of the
tree and the following happens:
i. the credit market now consists of two markets: the market for
working capital loans to firms and the market for government
bonds. The bankers serve first the domestic market (ls) up to
the sum of their endowment and the repayed government debt
they own (A+ b).
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ii. firms repay principal plus interests (ls(1 + r)) and the (intra-
period) working-capital loan market closes.
iii. bankers now serve the sovereign bond’s market. Each bond is
traded at a price of q and bankers can lend (qb′) only up to the
total of their resources (lsr + A+ b).
iv. all other markets (labor and goods) clear, and taxation and con-
sumption take place.
• Period t+1 arrives
2.3.2 Decision problems
In this section we describe the problems faced by each of the four economic
agents in the economy. The variable d stands for the default decision and can take
only two values: 0 (no default) or 1 (default).
2.3.2.1 Households’ problem
As indicated above, the only decisions of the households are the labor supply






s.t. ct +m = (1− τt)wtnt + ΠFt (2.2)
where ct stands for consumption, nt denotes labor supply, wt is the wage rate,
τt is the labor-income tax rate, Π
F
t represents the firm’s profits, and m is a constant
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spending aiming to capture the sum of investment and net exports.11





βtU((1− τt)wtnt + ΠFt −m,nt)
and the period-t FOC reads as:
Uc (1− τt)wt + Un = 0 (2.3)
Equation (2.3) can be rearranged into the familiar expression equating the




= (1− τt)wt (2.4)
2.3.2.2 Firms’ problem
The firms in this economy demand labor to produce the consumption good.
They face a working capital constraint that requires them to pay up-front a certain
fraction of the wages bill. In order to do so, firms will take intra-period loans from
the bankers. Given these features, the firms’ problem can be expressed as:
max
Nt,ldt
ΠFt = ztF (Nt)− wtNt + ldt − (1 + rt)ldt (2.5)
s.t. γwtNt ≤ ldt (2.6)
11The constant m is only added for calibration purposes so that the model can correctly match
the consumption-to-output ratio.
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where z is an aggregate technology shock, F (N) is the production function, ldt
is the demand for working capital loans, rt is the rate charged for the loan, and γ is
the fraction of the wages bill that must be paid up-front.
The working capital constraint is captured by equation (2.6). This equation
will always hold with equality because firms do not need loans for anything else than
paying γwtNt, therefore any borrowing over and above γwtNt would be sub-optimal.




ΠFt = ztF (Nt)− (1 + γrt)wtNt
The period-t FOC is:
ztFN = (1 + γrt)wt (2.7)
Condition (2.7) equates the marginal product of labor to the marginal cost
of hiring labor once the financial cost is factored in. Therefore, the optimality
conditions from the firm’s problem are equation (2.7) and equation (2.6) evaluated
with equality.
2.3.2.3 Bankers’ problem
Every period the bankers participate in two different credit markets: the loans
market and the sovereign bonds markets. The working assumption is that they
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participate in these markets sequentially.12
The problem of bankers can be written in recursive form as:
W (b, z) = max
x,ls,b′
v(x) + δEW (b′, z′) (2.8)
s.t. x = A+ (1− d)b+ lsr − (1− d)qb′ (2.9)
A+ (1− d)b ≥ ls (2.10)
where ls stands for working capital loans supply, b
′ represents government
bonds demand, A is the bankers’ endowment, r is the interest rate on the working
capital loans, and q is the price per sovereign bond.
v(x) is the period return function of the banker, x is the end-of-period con-
sumption of the banker, δ stands for the discount factor.
Equation (2.10) captures the implicit timing of the banking sector: the maxi-
mum the banker can lend to the firms is the sum of his endowment and the repayment
of government debt.
This problem can be rewritten as:
W (b, z) = max
ls,b′,µ
v(A+ (1− d)b+ lsr− (1− d)qb′) + δEW (b′, z′) +µ[A+ (1− d)b− ls]
Assuming differentiability of W (b, z), the first-order conditions are:
ls : v
′(x)r − µ = 0 (2.11)
b′ : − v′(x)q(1− d) + δEWb(b′, z′) = 0 (2.12)
µ : A+ (1− d)b− ls ≥ 0 & µ[A+ (1− d)b− ls] = 0 (2.13)
12The assumption of sequential banking is no different from the day-market/ night-market or
the decentralized-market/ centralized-market assumption commonly used in the money-search lit-
erature (see Lagos and Wright (2005)).
25
The envelope condition reads as:
Wb(b, z) = v
′(x)(1− d) + µ(1− d) (2.14)





Combining equations (2.12), (2.14) updated one period, and (2.15), and fo-






(1− d′)(1 + r′)
}
(2.16)
To interpret this optimality condition, define the Stochastic Discount Factor






≡ Λ = SDF (2.17)
and re-write the next period’s payoff of the sovereign bond as:
ϑ′ = (1− d′)(1 + r′) (2.18)
This expression shows that in case of default (d′ = 1) the lender not only losses
his investment in sovereign bonds but also losses the future gains that those bonds
would have created had them been repaid, which are summarized in r′.




E{Λϑ′} if d = 0
0 if d = 1
(2.19)
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This equation is the condition pinning down the price of debt subject to default
risk in this model. In standard sovereign default models with risk neutral foreign
lenders, Λ is replaced with the (inverse of the) world’s risk free rate, which represents
the lenders’ opportunity cost of funds. In contrast, here domestic bankers arbitrage
the price of today’s debt against the expected marginal benefit of further lending.
2.3.2.4 Government Budget Constraint
The government needs to tax labor income to pay for both the exogenous
spending and (in case it decides not to default) the debt obligations . Its budget
constraint can be expressed as:
g + (1− dt)Bt = τtwtnt + (1− dt)Bt+1qt (2.20)
where Bt stands for debt (with positive values meaning higher indebtness),
g is the exogenous government spending, τt is the labor income tax-rate, wt is the
wage rate, and nt stands for labor.
2.3.3 Competitive Equilibrium given Government Policies
Definition 1 A Competitive Equilibrium given Government Policies is a sequence
of allocations {ct, xt, nt, Nt, ldt , lst , bt+1}∞t=0 and prices {rt, wt,ΠFt }∞t=0 such that given
sovereign bond prices {qt}∞t=0, government policies {τt, dt, Bt}∞t=0, and shocks {m, g, zt}∞t=0
the following holds:
1. {ct, nt}∞t=0 solve the households’ problem in (2.1) - (2.2).
2. {Nt, ldt }∞t=0 solve the firm’s problem in (2.5) - (2.6).
3. {xt, lst , bt+1}∞t=0 solve the banker’s problem in (2.8) - (2.10).
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Figure 2.5: Loan Market in period t.
4. Markets clear:





and the Aggregate Resources Constraint holds:
ct + xt + g +m = zF (nt) + A
2.3.3.1 Loan Market Characterization
The main mechanism of the model is to highlight how a sovereign default
generates a credit crunch, which in turn shows up as an increase in the borrowing
costs for the corporate sector (firms) and a subsequently economic slowdown.
This mechanism puts the financial sector in the spotlight and Figure 2.5 shows
how the private credit market reacts to a sovereign default. Both the demand
for loans and the supply for loans can be obtained from the partial equilibrium
conditions coming from the firms’ and bankers’ optimization problems.
Given that the working capital loan is always risk free (because firms are
assumed to never default on the loans) the bankers are going to supply inelastically
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the maximum amount they can. This inelastic supply curve is affected by a default:
when the government defaults, bankers’ holdings of government debt become non-
performing and therefore they cannot be used in the private credit market. This
is graphed as a shift to left of the Ls curve Figure 2.5. All this ends up in firms
facing higher borrowing costs: r∗d > r
∗. The planner (whose problem is defined in
the following subsection) takes into account how a default will disrupt this market.
2.3.4 Determination of Government Policies
We focus on Markov-Perfect equilibria where government policies are functions
of pay-off relevant state variables: the level of public debt and the technological
shock.
The benevolent planer wants to maximize the welfare of the residents. To do
so it has three policy tools: taxation, debt and default; but it is subject to two
constraints: (1) the allocations that emerge from the government policies should
represent a competitive equilibrium, and (2) the government budget constraint must
hold.
The optimization problem of the government can be recursively written as:
V(b, z) = max
d∈{0,1}
(1− d)Vnd + dVd (2.21)
Given that there are two kind of residents (households and bankers) the overall
objective function of the planner is a convex combination of the value functions of
these two residents. Then:
V i(b, z) = θV i(b, z) + (1− θ)W i(b, z)
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where i = d, nd and θ is the weight assigned to the households’ happiness in
the planner’s objective function. The parameter θ gives the model certain flexibility.
Letting θ be equal to one, implies that the planner will not take into account the
welfare of bankers, putting the environment closer to the traditional Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981) approach, where the lenders are foreigners and therefore no part
of the planners objective function. Moving θ to zero implies that the planner will
only care about bankers.
Following (2.8) W i(b, z) represents the banker’s value function. The house-
hold’s value function, on the other hand, is defined as: V i = U(c, n) + βEV i(b′, z′).
Therefore, the value of no default is:
Vnd(b, z) = max
n,c,b′,x
{
θV nd(b, z) + (1− θ)W nd(b, z)
}
subject to:
V nd(b, z) = U(c, n) + βEV nd(b′, z′)
W nd(b, z) = v(x) + δEW nd(b′, z′)
g + b = τwn+ b′q (gov’t b.c.)
c+ x+ g +m = zF (n) + A (resources const.)


















Rewriting the constraints in terms of allocations only we obtain:
30
V nd(b, z) = U(c, n) + βEV nd(b′, z′)
W nd(b, z) = v(x) + δEW nd(b′, z′)







c+ x+ g +m = zF (K,n) + A











(1− d′)(1 + r′)
}
V nd and W nd represent the values of the household and the banker under
no-default, respectively.
In case the sovereign decides to default it gets excluded from the credit market
in that period. There is a probability φ that the government will regain access to
the financial market in which case its debt is forgiven (i.e. it gets a fresh start).








V d(z) = U(c, n) + βE
{
φV nd(0, z′) + (1− φ)V d(z′)
}
W d(z) = v(x) + δE
{
φW nd(0, z′) + (1− φ)W d(z′)
}
g = τwn (gov’t b.c.)
c+ x+ g +m = zF (n) + A (resources const.)












2.3.4.1 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Definition 2 The Markov Perfect Equilibrium for this economy is (i) a borrowing
rule b′(b, z) and a default rule d(b, z) with associated value functions {V(b, z),Vnd(b, z),Vd(z)},
consumption(s) and labor plans {c(b, z), x(b, z), n(b, z)} and taxation rule τ(b, z), (ii)
an equilibrium pricing function for the sovereign bond q(b′, z), such that:
1. Given the price q(b′, z), the borrowing and default rules solve the sovereign’s
maximization problem in (2.21)
2. Given the price q(b′, z) and the borrowing and default rules; the consumption
and labor plans {c(b, z), x(b, z), n(b, z)} are consistent with competitive equilib-
rium.
3. Given the price q(b′, z) and the borrowing and default rules; the taxation rule
τ(b, z) satisfies the government budget constraint.
4. The price equilibrium function satisfies equation (2.19)
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2.4 Quantitative Findings
2.4.1 Functional Forms and Stochastic Processes







The above preferences (called GHH after Greenwood et al. (1988)) have been
traditionally used in the Small Open Economy - Real Business Cycle literature.13
These preferences shut-off the wealth effect on labor supply and therefore help avoid-
ing the potentially undesirable effect of having a counter-factual increase in output
on default periods.14




The production function available to the firms is:
F (N) = Nα
The only source of exogenous uncertainty in this economy is a productivity
shock zt. This shock follows an AR(1) process:
log zt = ρ log zt−1 + εt
where εt is an i.i.d. N(0, σ
2
z).
13See, for example, Mendoza (1991).
14Using GHH preferences the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor does
not depend on consumption, and therefore the labor supply is not affected by wealth effects. For
a related analysis about how important are GHH preferences in generating output drops in the
Sudden Stops literature, see Chakraborty (2009).
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2.4.2 Calibration
The model is calibrated at an annual frequency using data for Argentina for
the period 1980-2005. Table 2.3 contains the parameter values.
Curvature of labor disutility ω 2.5 Frisch wage elasticity
Labor share in output α 0.70 Standard value
Household risk aversion σc 2 Standard value
Banker risk aversion σb 0 Risk-Neutral bankers
Probability of redemption φ 0.50 Mean exclusion spell
Government Spending g 0.15 Gov’t Spending/GDP = 20%
Investment + Net Exports m 0.075 (I + NX )/GDP = 10%
Banker’s discount factor δ 0.96 Standard value RBC
Working capital requirement γ 0.51 Wages bill/Private credit = 51%
Weight of hh. in planner’s obj. function θ 0.5 Equal weight
Household’s discount factor β 0.80 Mean Debt/ output =̃ 16%
Banker’s endowment A 0.2 Mean exposure ratio =̃ 35%
TFP autocorrelation coefficient ρ 0.90 GDP autocorrelation
Std. dev. of innovations σz 2.7% GDP std. dev.
Table 2.3: Benchmark Calibration.
The parameters above the line are set to independently match moments from
the data or are parameters that take common values in the literature. The labor
share in output (α) and the risk aversion parameter for the households (σc) are set to
0.7 and 2 respectively, which are standard values in the quantitative macroeconomics
literature. Banker’s risk aversion σb is set to zero to feature risk-neutral bankers.
The value of the exogenous spending level g is set up to 0.15 to match the ratio of
General Government Expenditures to GDP for Argentina in the period 1985-2000
of 20% (from World Bank’s World Development Indicators). Parameter m is meant
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to capture the level of investment (I) plus net exports (NX) and it is set to 0.075
so that the ratio (I+NX)/GDP generated by the model is equal to the observed
ratio, 10%. The working capital requirement parameter (γ) is taken directly from
the Argentine data. In the model γ is equal to the ratio of private credit to wage
payments, the data shows that for Argentina this ratio was 51% (for the period
1993-2001).15
The discount factor for the bankers (i.e., the lenders) takes a usual value
in RBC models with annual frequency, 0.96. It is important to realize that the
exact value of δ is not crucial in itself but in how it compares with the household’s
discount factor (discussed below). The weight that households’ utility receives on
the planner’s overall objective function (θ) is set in the benchmark calibration to
0.5 in order to give all the residents (bankers and households) the same weight. It is
crucial to see that if θ takes the value of one, then the model features ’international
banks’ and hence facilitates the comparison with previous literature that focused on
external debt and default: this is exercise is done as part of a sensitivity analysis,
later in the manuscript.16
There are two more above the line parameters to discuss: the curvature of
labor disutility (ω) and the probability of redemption (φ). The value of ω is typically
chosen to match empirical evidence on the Frisch wage elasticity, 1/(ω − 1). The
estimates for this elasticity vary considerably: Greenwood et al. (1988) cite estimates
15In order to construct this ratio we took data for Private Credit from IMF’s International
Financial Statistics, and data for Total Wage-Earners Remuneration from INDEC(Argentina’s
Census and Statistics Office).
16Setting θ = 1 features international banks but does not make our model collapse to the ones
in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). The reason is very clear: in our model these
international banks are not deep-pocket, but are only able to lend up to A+ (1− d)b.
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from previous studies ranging from 0.3 to 2.2, González and Sala Lorda (2011) find
estimates from −13.1 to 12.8 for Mercosur countries. Here we take ω = 2.5 as the
benchmark scenario (implying a Frisch wage elasticity of 0.67) and conduct some
sensitivity analysis later.
The probability of redemption is governed by the parameter φ. The evidence
collected by Gelos et al. (2004) is that emerging economies remain excluded on
average 4 years after a default. This finding applies only to external defaults. It can
be argued that governments have a additional mechanisms (regulatory measures,
moral suasion, etc.) to place their debt in domestic markets making the domestic
exclusion shorter than the external exclusion. Therefore the benchmark calibration
will be φ = 0.5, which given the annual calibration implies a mean exclusion of 2
years. Alternative values for φ are considered in the sensitivity analysis section.
The parameters below the line {β,A, ρ , σz} are simultaneously determined in
order to match a set of meaningful moments of the data. The moments matched by
the model are all taken from Argentine data and they are the mean domestic debt
to output ratio, the mean exposure of the banking sector to government debt, and
the autocorrelation and standard deviation of GDP.
Given that the model features both a closed economy the correct debt-to-
output ratio to match is the Domestic Debt to GDP. To do so I take the ratio
of Total Debt to Output from Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and extract only the
Domestic Debt part of it by using the share of Domestic Debt to Total Debt form




from Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)
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This exercise gives a mean Domestic Debt to GDP ratio of 16.5% for the period
1980-2002. As it was documented in section 2 the banking sector of virtually every
emerging economy is highly exposed to government debt. The mean exposure ratio
(defined in section 2) for Argentina was approximately 25%.
The autocorrelation and standard deviation of Argentine GDP were computed
at an annual frequency from the time series available from INDEC (the Argentine
Census and Statistics Office) for the period 1980-2005. The autocorrelation of the
cyclical component of GDP is 0.28 and the standard deviation is 4.11%.17
2.4.3 Results
This section examines the performance of the benchmark calibration of the
model in accounting for some key statistical moments of business cycles and govern-
ment debt. Table 3.2 reports the moments from the simulations of the model and
compares them with the moments from Argentine data.
Overall the benchmark calibration of the model is able to account for several
salient facts of the Argentine economy, namely a ratio of consumption volatility
to output volatility grater than 1, countercyclical sovereign spreads, and a high
and positive correlation between output and consumption.18 All of these moments
17The series obtained from INDEC is real GDP, and it was first logged and then H-P filtered
using a smoothing parameter of 6.25 (as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002)).






corr(Rs, y) -0.62 -0.81
corr(c, y) 0.97 0.99
corr(N, y) 0.52 0.99
corr(Rs, N) -0.58 -0.77
Mean output drop 9.40% 8.23%
Mean credit drop 27.09% 8.17%
Default rate 2.56% 1.60%
Mean debt/ output 16.5% 16.84%
Gov’t Spending/ output 20% 19.75%
Mean Exposure Ratio 36% 36.12%
Table 2.4: Simulated Moments and Data. Rs stands for bond’s spread. The data for
sovereign spreads is taken from J.P. Morgan’s EMBI, which represents the difference in
yields between an Argentine bond and a US bond of similar maturity. The spreads gener-
ated by the model are the difference between the the interest rate paid by the government
and the one paid by the private sector.
were not targeted by the calibration process and are reproduced by the model.
The benchmark calibration also captures nicely the negative correlation between
employment and sovereign spreads, as well as procyclical employment.
The model does well at replicating the mean output drop. Data from INDEC
indicates that in the recent Argentine default episode GDP fell 9.4 percentage points
from trend. The benchmark calibration delivers an average decrease of 8.23 percent.
The sovereign default triggers a credit crunch in the model and it in turn generates
an output collapse. This collapse is due to a reduced access to the labor input,
which is the only variable input in the economy. The fact that the economy cannot
resort to a substitute input generates a sharp output decline. It is again important
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to remark that the mean output drop was not among the targeted moments in the
calibration procedure.
The credit drop that drives the endogenous cost of default is a novel contribu-
tion of our analysis. The benchmark calibration of the model is able to produce a
mean credit drop of 8.17% which accounts for 30% of the actual credit drop observed
in the 2001-02 Argentine default.
The model does not do well in terms of matching the mean default rate, but this
deserves further consideration. According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) Argentina
has defaulted on its domestic debt 5 times since its independence in 1816, implying a
default probability of 2.5%. It is typical in quantitative studies of sovereign default
to calibrate the models to the observed frequency of default. Other models in the
literature when calibrated to obtain the observed default frequency usually do poorly
in some key dimensions, like the mean debt ratio.
2.4.3.1 Output dynamics around defaults
An important result of the chapter is to provide a framework able to deliver
endogenous output declines in default periods. Figure 4 is constructed from the
model simulations in the following way: first, we identify the simulation periods
where default happens; second, we construct a time series of 8 years before and 3
years after each default; third, we average across default episodes to construct a
series of the mean output behavior around defaults.
As it is clear from Figure 2.6 the model features an output decline (and a
consequent consumption decline) in the default period. The model is also able to
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Figure 2.6: Output around defaults.
deliver a v-shape behavior of output around defaults: a strategic default is the
optimal crisis resolution mechanism - - due to worsening economic conditions, the
sovereign finds it optimal to default on its obligations (and assume the associated
costs) instead of increasing the revenues required for repayment.
2.4.3.2 Endogenous cost of default: Credit contraction
Why does a default generate such a costly output decline? This chapter pro-
poses a credit crunch explanation: given that bankers hold government debt as part
of their assets, when a default comes a considerable fraction of these assets losses
value, therefore their lending ability contracts and as a consequence credit to the
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Figure 2.7: Credit crunch.
private sector diminishes. Given that the productive sector is in need of external
financing, a credit crunch translates into an output decline.19
Figure 2.7 shows how a credit crunch looks in the model. The benchmark
parametrization of the model is able to produce a collapse in the private sector
credit (i.e., working capital loans to firms, in the model).
Figure 2.7 also shows how the exclusion from the credit market affects the
credit availability and consequently output. In the top panels of this figure we can
see the workings of a credit crunch: firms are in need of external financing, therefore
when loanable funds shrink, output shrinks with them.
19Bolton and Jeanne (2011) identify this phenomenon as banks becoming illiquid.
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Figure 2.8: Labor tax rate around defaults.
We can also see the effect of exclusion from financial markets: if the government
remains excluded then the private credit reduces (and remains low) and the output
decline becomes more protracted. On the other hand, an immediate re-access to the
credit market implies a rapid recovery in both credit and output.
Compared to the behavior observed in the data (i.e. Figure 2.3 in Section
2) the model is unable to generate any persistence. An interesting extension is to
allow the bankers endowment A to be endogenously chosen: in this way bad states
of the nature (where default will sometimes happen) give little incentive to build-up
A. When a default hits, then there is even less incentives to accumulate A and this
(possibly coupled with longer exclusion spells for the defaulting government) leads
to lower private credit after a default.
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2.4.3.3 Benefit of defaults: reduced taxation
As argued in the introduction, the optimal default decision comes from balanc-
ing costs and benefits of defaults. The costs of default were already discussed above:
output declines because of a credit contraction. The benefits on the other hand come
from reduced taxation. Figure 2.8 shows the behavior of the labor income tax rate
around defaults: we plot the equilibrium tax rate and also the ”counterfactual” tax
rate that would have been necessary if instead of defaulting the government had
repaid.
The reduced taxation is precisely the difference between the counterfactual
repayment rate and the equilibrium tax rate: for the benchmark calibration this
difference is of 13 percentage points on average. Appendix A shows that this ratio-
nale also goes through in a modified model where the sovereign has access only to
lump-sum (i.e. non-distortionary) taxation.
2.4.3.4 Sovereign bonds market
In this section we analyze the behavior of the government bonds market. To
this end, we show a set of charts that are often used in the default literature for
this purpose. As discussed above, the model performs quite well with respect to the
sovereign bond market dynamics: it produces default in bad times and (therefore)
countercyclical spreads.
Figure 2.9 shows the equilibrium default region and the bond price function,
respectively. With respect to top panel, the white area represents the repayment
area: it decreases (until it vanishes) while the indebtness level increases and/or
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Figure 2.9: d(b, z) and q(b′, z).
the level of the technology shock decreases. The bottom panel presents the price
schedule that the government faces. As it was expected, the price the sovereign
receives for each bond decreases with TFP and also with the total level of indebtness.
Now we turn to the behavior of spreads in the run up to a default. Figure 8
shows that the spreads generated by the model are able to mimic the behavior of
the EMBI spreads in that they are relatively flat until the year previous to a default
when they spike. On the other hand the mean spreads are higher than the observed
ones away from default and lower than the data in period before.
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Figure 2.10: Spreads before a default.
2.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we perform a sensitivity analysis to gain a better understanding
of how a set of key moments in the baseline calibration react to changes in the
underlaying parameters. Table 2.5 summarizes the findings of this exercise.
Let’s first study how the model economy reacts to changes in the re-entry
probability (φ). If the government could re-access immediately after a default (φ =
1) then the overall costs of a default (exclusion form credit markets are among
them) are reduced. Lower costs of default makes default a more attractive choice,
so we see that for φ = 1 default is more frequent. Consequently less debt can be
sustained. If on the other hand we lower φ making re-access less frequent then the
exclusion-cost-of-default is larger and the government is able to sustain higher debt
ratios. The endogenous cost of default in this chapter works through a reduction in
credit availability: the higher the debt the government defaults on, the higher the
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Moments (in %)
Default rate E{b/y} E{Rs} Exposure y ↓ Credit ↓
Data 2.5 16.50 7.43 36 9.40 27.09
Benchmark 1.60 16.84 6.17 36.12 8.23 8.17
re-entry (benchmark: φ = 0.5)
φ = 0.05 0.73 24.91 4.31 42.93 5.72 6.88
φ = 0.1 0.91 24.81 4.72 44.21 6.06 7.05
φ = 1 1.63 16.53 5.99 36.95 10.02 10.92
w-k constraint (benchmark: γ = 0.51)
γ → 0 0 0 − 0 n.a. n.a.
γ = 0.1 0 0 − 0 n.a. n.a.
γ = 0.3 2.56 0.04 6.80 0.16 −0.81 0.01
γ = 0.6 0.75 38.47 4.84 47.10 12.38 14.12
γ = 0.7 0.27 63.46 4.40 56.13 18.81 19.37
Frisch wage elasticity (benchmark: ω = 2.5)
0.5 (ω = 3) 3.51 9.52 7.57 24.32 6.84 4.46
1 (ω = 2) 1.06 36.09 5.13 49.21 9.29 14.87
Banker’s endowment (benchmark: A = 0.2)
A = 0.1 0 109.91 0 75.31 n.a. n.a.
A = 0.3 12.25 0.43 77.13 1.12 −0.35 0.10
A = 0.5 0 0 − 0 n.a. n.a.
HH weight on V(b, z) (benchmark: θ = 0.5)
θ = 0 0 39.96 0 22.22 n.a. n.a.
θ = 1 0.89 35.16 4.90 48.16 7.40 9.69
Table 2.5: Sensitivity Analysis.
cost, and this we see as we increase the value of φ.
Next, let’s examine how the model behaves with different values of γ. This
parameter governs the tightness of the working capital constraint, γ ∈ (0, 1]. A
high (low) value of γ means that firms need to pay up front a higher (lower) ratio
of their wage bill, therefore working capital loans are more (less) important for
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production. We can see that the model performs as expected: for lower values of
γ (cases in which private credit is not that important for production) default is
not very costly, consequently the government feels tempted to default too much.
Creditors understand this and contract lending in the government bonds market.
Therefore we see that for values of γ → 0, the mean debt ratio is zero and then the
observed default rate is also zero. On the other hand, high values of γ make default
very costly. Consequently the observed debt ratios are higher and the observed
default rates are low. In these rare (i.e. rarer than the benchmark) defaults, the
costs in terms of output and credit drops considerable larger than in the benchmark
calibration.
When it comes to the Frisch wage elasticity (1/(ω − 1)) the behavior of the
model is as expected. A higher wage elasticity of labor supply implies that when a
default comes and firms have to decrease their labor demand (due to higher costs
of financing) the decline in equilibrium labor is greater than with a more inelastic
labor supply. Therefore (as expected) for lower values of ω (higher elasticity) the
model features higher output drop at default and can sustain lager debt ratios, and
for higher values of ω the opposite is true.
Banker’s endowment A is a crucial parameter for the workings of the credit
crunch. Basically a higher level of A makes government debt less important for
the private credit market. The planner understands this and it is more tempted
to default when A is larger. Lenders foresee this behavior and refrain from lending
to the government. Therefore we observe a non-monotonic relation here: for low
enough levels of A (e.g. A = 0.1) default is too painful for the firms and therefore
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the government decides to never default and with this it is able to sustain large
debt ratios. Conversely, for large enough levels of A (e.g. A = 0.3) defaults are less
painful for the private credit market and therefore the government is more tempted
to default (we observe larger default rates) and it is able to sustain lower debt ratios.
For even larger levels of A, everyone understands that debt is not very important
for the credit markets and that governments will be tempted to default on it every
time they have a chance, therefore nobody lends.
Finally, we examine the role of θ, the weight that households receive in the
planner’s objective function. If θ = 1 it means the planner only cares about house-
holds or (what is the same) bankers are not residents but instead they are inter-
national banks. If this is the case we can compare the model against other models
of external sovereign debt and default. In that dimension the model does a very
good job: it obtains a reasonable default probability (0.90%) and achieves a debt
to output ratio close to the data (external debt to output in Argentina was around
36%). On the other extreme if θ = 0, then the ”planner” only cares about the
bankers and given the bankers are the only lenders, default would never be optimal.
Therefore the planner can sustain higher debt ratios (higher than in the benchmark
calibration).
2.4.5 Discussion of the assumptions
The model just described made a series of simplifying assumptions in order
to isolate the effect that a sovereign default has on the banking sector and the
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productive sector of the economy. In this subsection we discuss them, ways to relax
them and potential implications.
Constant g: in order to make the optimal fiscal policy as simple as possible
we had assumed a constant level of government expenditure, g. While this is a useful
first approximation relaxing this assumption could improve the model’s quantitative
performance. How to do it? The first thing to do is to make g valuable: a common
approach is to include g in the household’s utility function. Then, g becomes an
extra fiscal policy instrument: the planner understands that higher g implies either
higher τ or higher indebtness, but also takes into account the agents’ preference
for g. Then, when a default comes and consumption declines the planner finds
it optimal to decrease g as well in order to satisfy the intratemporal optimality
condition relating private and public consumption. Therefore the model would be
able to account for the observed procyclicality of government spending.
Financial autarky: we presented a model of a closed economy where gov-
ernment debt is held by domestic bankers. While this is an attractive environment
to study the implications of a sovereign default on the domestic financial sector
it comes at the expense of having an unrealistic closed capital account. If we let
the government borrow form abroad as well as from the domestic bankers then
the model becomes one of domestic and external sovereign debt, a missing piece in
the quantitative literature on sovereign defaults. Nonetheless, this extension would
bring other forces into play. The possibility of selective defaults can in principle
mitigate the negative effect that a sovereign default has on the domestic economy:
by defaulting on foreign lenders the government could in principle afford to serve
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the domestic lenders. Allowing the private sector to borrow form abroad as well
will decrease the relevance of the domestic credit market for domestic production.
However, as long as a fraction of the domestic firms needs to borrow from domestic
sources the mechanism proposed in the model will still play an important role.
Constant A: assuming bankers receive a constant endowment every period
allows us to fix ideas and focus on the asset side of the bankers’ balance sheet and how
it responds to a sovereign default. Relaxing this assumption is clearly a desirable step
towards bringing the model closer to the data. Allowing (for example) for deposits
from the households will enrich the environment and make it able to capture another
salient feature of emerging economies crises: bank runs. Anticipating the possibility
of a sovereign default and fearing banks will not be able to fully repay the deposits,
households will run on the banks and therefore put more pressure on the availability
of loanable funds in the economy.
2.5 Conclusions
The prevalence of defaults and banking crises is a defining feature of emerging
economies. Three facts are noteworthy about these episodes: 1- Default and Banking
crises tend to happen together (with 64% of banking crises happening together with
or right after a default), 2- the banking sector is highly exposed to government debt
(with emerging economies’ banking sector holding on average 30% of their assets
in government bonds), and 3- crises episodes are episodes of decreased output and
credit.
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In this chapter we have provided a rationale for this phenomena. Bankers who
are exposed to government debt suffer from a sovereign default that reduces the
value of their assets (i.e. a banking crisis). This forces these bankers to decrease the
credit to the productive private sector. This credit crunch translates in both lower
and more costly financing for the productive sector, which generates an endogenous
output decline.
This chapter presents a theory of the transition mechanism of sovereign de-
faults to the banking sector and the rest of the economy. A methodological contri-
bution of this chapter is to present a competing mechanism to endogenize the costs
of sovereign defaults: a sovereign default generates a credit crunch, and this credit
crunch generates output declines.
The model shows an overall qualitative fit of the data (v-shape behavior of
output around defaults, credit contractions at default). On a quantitative note,
several dimensions are accurately accounted for: countercyclicality of bond spreads,
mean default rate, mean output drop.
Some avenues for future research / possible extensions are:
• Incorporating an endogenous banker’s net worth accumulation: this extension
can in principle generate some persistence in the model and help to capture
the time profile of domestic credit better.
• Bank leverage and regulatory policy: banks behavior is intentionally crude
in the model (at this point simplifications are necessary to compute a rather
complicated Markov Perfect optimal policy problem) but one could think of
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the potential implications that regulatory policy could have for bank leverage.
If government debt (by regulation) is considered risk-free then banks have ad-
ditional incentives to hold government debt. On the other hand a default not
only decreases banks assets but also diminishes their leverage. Then the gov-
ernment faces a meaningful trade-off when considering both its debt position
and the default policy.
• Endogenous government spending: making public spending valuable and let-
ting the government optimally chose its level will increase the complexity of
the planning problem but could also improve the model’s ability to account
for the observed procyclicality of government expenditures.
• Political economy of sovereign defaults. A default in this model implies redis-
tribution from bankers (lenders) to households (taxpayers). It would be an
interesting extension to study the politico-economic equilibrium that would
arise if agents were allowed to vote on the default policies.
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Chapter 3
Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk 1
3.1 Introduction
This paper presents a measure of the effects of the debt dilution induced by
governments’ borrowing decisions and shows how these effects can be mitigated with
debt contracts that specify borrowing-contingent payments. If governments could
commit to not dilute the value of current bond issuances with future borrowing,
this would allow them to sell bonds at a higher price. Sovereign debt dilution
may become a problem when governments do not have the ability to make such
commitment.
Participants in various credit markets have made efforts to mitigate the dilu-
tion problem, which is suggestive of the relevance assigned to this issue. Corporate
debt contracts often include covenants intended to limit debt dilution (Asquith
1Co-authored with Juan Carlos Hatchondo (Richmond Fed.) and Leonardo Martinez
(IMF).
For comments and suggestions, we thank Fernando Alvarez, Luis Brandao-Marques, Fer-
nando Broner, Satyajit Chatterjee, Pablo D’Erasmo, Bora Durdu, Enrique Mendoza, Dirk
Niepelt, Jorge Roldos, Diego Saravia, and seminar participants at the U.S. Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, the University of Virginia, the Federal Reserve Bank
of Richmond, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, the Universidad Nacional de Tucumán,
the 2009 Wegmans conference, the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, the Central
Bank of Chile, the 2010 Royal Economic Society Meeting, the 2010 Eastern Economic
Association Meeting, the 2010 SED conference, the 2010 Berlin Conference on Sovereign
Debt and Default, the 2010 and 2011 AEA meetings, the ECB, and the 2011 NBER Inter-
national Finance and Macroeconomics Workshop. Remaining mistakes are our own. The
views expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the IMF,
its Executive Board, or its management, the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, or the
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et al. (2005), Smith and Warner (1979) and Rodgers (1964) discuss corporate debt
covenants). In some cases, debt claims differ in their seniority—if existing debt is se-
nior to new issuances, this may mitigate the dilution problem. A seniority structure
is common in corporate debt and collateralized loans to households. In contrast,
sovereign bonds typically do not present differences in legal seniority but include
a pari passu clause and a negative pledge clause that prohibits future issuances of
collateralized debt.2 These clauses are intended to avoid making new debt senior to
previously issued debt, but do not make existing debt senior to debt that will be
issued in the future.
The weaker protection against sovereign debt dilution may be due in part to
the weak enforcement of sovereign debt claims.3 Overall, it seems clear that existing
sovereign debt contracts do not eliminate the risk of debt dilution.
The possibility of sovereign debt dilution has also received considerable atten-
tion in both academic and policy discussions. Several studies describe the benefits
of eliminating debt dilution. For instance, Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) show how
dilution may lead to equilibria with higher debt levels and higher interest rates
implied by higher default probabilities. It has also been argued that dilution may
2Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) explain how in Ecuador’s 2000 sovereign debt restruc-
turing, the government exchanged defaulted bonds for new bonds that included a clause specifying
that if a default occurred within 10 years following the restructuring agreement, the government
would extend new bonds to the holders of the restructured debt. Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer
(2006) argue that the “effect of this was to offer a (limited) protection of bond holders against the
dilution of their claims by new debt holders in the event of default.” However, the inclusion of such
debt covenants is much more an exception than a rule. It has also been argued that loans from
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank receive de facto seniority
over loans from private agents (see, for example, Saravia (2010)).
3This weak enforcement has lead to several proposals to induce more orderly sovereign debt
restructurings (see, for example, Bolton and Skeel Jr (2005), Borensztein et al. (2004), G-10 (2002),
IMF (2003), Krueger and Hagan (2005), and Paulus (2002)).
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lead to excessive issuance of short-term debt (Kletzer (1984)), or of debt that is
hard to restructure after a default (Bolton and Jeanne (2005)), which in turn could
increase the likelihood and/or severity of sovereign debt crises. Bolton and Skeel Jr
(2005) argue for the importance of being able to grant seniority to debt issued while
the country is negotiating with holders of debt in default, as observed in corporate
bankruptcy procedures. Borensztein et al. (2004) suggest changes in national and
international laws that may facilitate the introduction of debt contracts that pro-
vide some protection against debt dilution.4 While these studies suggest that debt
dilution may be an important source of inefficiencies in debt markets, they do not
quantify the effects of dilution.
We do so using a default framework à la Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).5 For-
mally, we analyze a small open economy that receives a stochastic endowment stream
of a single tradable good. The government’s objective is to maximize the expected
utility of private agents. Each period, the government makes two decisions. First, it
decides whether to default on previously issued debt. Second, it decides how much to
borrow. The government can borrow by issuing non-contingent long-duration bonds,
as in Hatchondo and Martinez (forthcoming). The cost of defaulting is represented
by an endowment loss that is incurred in the default period.
The most common modeling approach for the study of debt dilution is to focus
4Detragiache (1994), Eaton and Fernandez (1995), Niepelt (2008), Sachs and Cohen (1982),
Tirole (2002), and UN (2004) also discuss inefficiencies raised by debt dilution.
5This framework has been used in many recent studies. See, for instance, Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006), Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009), Arellano (2008), Boz (2009), Cuadra et al. (forthcoming),
D’Erasmo (2011), Durdu et al. (2010), Lizarazo (2005, 2006), and Yue (2010). These models share
blueprints with the models used in studies of household bankruptcy—see, for example, Athreya
et al. (2007), Chatterjee et al. (2007), Li and Sarte (2006), Livshits et al. (2008), and Sánchez
(2008).
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on the effect of seniority clauses.6 However, it is well known that seniority does not
fully eliminate debt dilution if new borrowing increases the default probability (see,
for example, Bizer and DeMarzo (1992)). Therefore, in general, one cannot measure
accurately the effects of dilution by comparing equilibria with and without seniority.
Furthermore, seniority clauses may not be useful to eliminate sovereign debt dilution
in reality. Weak enforcement of sovereign debt claims may constitute an obstacle to
implementing a meaningful seniority structure.
A second approach for the study of debt dilution is to compare equilibria ob-
tained with long-duration and with one-period bonds.7 However, one-period bonds
do not only eliminate dilution but also increase rollover risk. We show that, in
general, one cannot measure accurately the effects of dilution by comparing equi-
libria with one-period and with long-duration bonds: Lower default probabilities
with one-period bonds are not only the result of the elimination of debt dilution but
also the result of the lower debt levels chosen by the borrower to mitigate rollover
risk. Furthermore, while eliminating dilution with borrowing-contingent payments
increases welfare, replacing long-duration bonds by one-period bonds in the presence
of rollover risk decreases welfare.
We propose a new approach for the study of the effects of debt dilution. We
6For instance, Bi (2006) analyzes a model with one-quarter and two-quarter bonds and studies
the effects of making earlier issuances senior to new issuances.
7Intertemporal debt dilution only appears with long-duration bonds. With one-period bonds,
when the government decides its current issuance level, the outstanding debt level is zero (either
because the government honored its debt obligations at the beginning of the period or because
it defaulted on them). Thus, the government cannot dilute the value of debt issued in previous
periods. Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011) and Hatchondo and Martinez (forthcoming) show that
in a sovereign default framework, equilibrium default risk is significantly higher with long-duration
bonds than with one-period bonds.
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modify the baseline model by assuming that sovereign bonds include a covenant
specifying that after each time the government borrows it compensates existing
bondholders by paying the difference between the bond market price that would have
been observed absent current-period borrowing and the observed market price. With
this borrowing-contingent payment, bonds’ values become independent from future
borrowing and thus, there is no dilution caused by borrowing decisions. We measure
the effects of dilution by comparing simulations of the baseline model (with dilution)
with the ones of the modified model (without dilution). We impose discipline to
our quantitative exercise by calibrating the baseline model to match data from an
economy facing default risk (Argentina before its 2001 default).
We find that, if the sovereign eliminates debt dilution, the number of defaults
per 100 years decreases from 5.6 (with dilution) to 0.9 (without dilution). That
is, dilution accounts for 84% of the default risk in the simulations of the baseline
model. Reducing the default frequency is beneficial for welfare because defaulting is
ex-ante inefficient. Thus, our exercise is indicative of the quantitative importance of
dilution and supports the view that dilution should be a central issue in discussions
of sovereign debt management and the international financial architecture (e.g.,
Borensztein et al. (2004)).
Eliminating dilution allows the government to choose a low default risk. With
dilution, default risk is high even if the government chooses very low debt levels that
almost certainly would not trigger a default in the following period. This is the case
because future governments would increase the debt level. As long as a government
cannot control the choices of future governments, it cannot choose low default risk.
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Promising borrowing-contingent payments allow the government to moderate the
borrowing levels that future governments will choose.
The government’s ability to choose low default risk is reflected in its borrowing
opportunities (i.e., the set of combinations of levels of debt and interest rates the
government can choose from). Thus, eliminating dilution shifts the set of govern-
ment’s borrowing opportunities. The equilibrium combinations of debt and interest
rate levels in the simulations without dilution are not part of the government’s
choice set with dilution. For no-dilution equilibrium debt levels, the equilibrium
interest rate would be about 400 basis points higher in the economy with dilution.
Borrowing-contingent payments weaken the government’s incentives to issue debt
and thus imply lower future issuance levels. For any debt level, the expectation of
lower future issuance levels implies a lower default probability. This in turn allows
the government to pay a lower interest rate.
The borrowing-contingent payments that eliminate dilution may be difficult
to implement in practice. This is because determining these payments requires
knowledge of the price at which bonds would have traded in the absence of current-
period borrowing. While that price can be easily computed in our simulations, it
may be difficult to determine in practice.
However, we show that most gains from eliminating dilution can be obtained
with two simple borrowing-contingent payments that depend only on the sovereign
bond market price. In one, the sovereign promises to pay a predetermined share of
current borrowing revenues to the holder of each bond issued in previous periods.
In the other, borrowing-contingent payments are a decreasing function of the bond
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market price. The benchmark default frequency is reduced 69% with the first scheme
and 86% with the second scheme.
It should be emphasized that our findings are not based on the assumption
that the government cannot default on borrowing-contingent payments in the same
way it can default on other payments. Sovereign debt contracts often contain an ac-
celeration clause and a cross-default clause (for example, see IMF (2002a)). The first
clause allows creditors to call the debt they hold in case the government defaults on
a payment. The cross-default clause states that a default in any government obliga-
tion constitutes a default in the contract containing that clause. These clauses imply
that in practice, when the government chooses to default on a payment it chooses to
default on all its debt. The implementation of borrowing-contingent payments only
requires that defaulting on borrowing-contingent payments would trigger accelera-
tion and cross-default clauses and, therefore, a default on all government debt.
The borrowing-contingent payments studied in this paper resemble covenants
commonly used in corporate debt contracts to transfer resources from debtors to
creditors when credit quality deteriorates (for instance, because of an increase in in-
debtedness). For example, Asquith et al. (2005) document such “interest-increasing
performance pricing” and find lower interest rates for contracts with this pricing.
Borrowing-contingent payments also resemble taxes used in previous studies
for eliminating overborrowing by private debtors (see Bianchi (2011) and the refer-
ences therein). In these studies, borrowing by one agent increases other agents’ cost
of borrowing and the probability of a crisis. Taxing private borrowing reduces the
frequency of crises. In this paper, the borrowing by future governments increases
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the current government’s cost of borrowing and the default probability. Borrowing-
contingent payments “tax” borrowing by future governments and thus reduce default
risk.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the model.
Section 3 discusses the calibration. Section 3.4 presents the results. Section 3.5
concludes and discusses possible extensions of our analysis.
3.2 The model
We first discuss the baseline model with debt dilution and later introduce
borrowing-contingent payments that allows us to quantify the role of debt dilution.
3.2.1 The baseline environment
There is a single tradable good. The economy receives a stochastic endowment
stream of this good yt, where
log(yt) = (1− ρ)µ+ ρ log(yt−1) + εt,
with |ρ| < 1, and εt ∼ N (0, σ2ε ).
The government’s objective is to maximize the present expected discounted








where E denotes the expectation operator, β denotes the subjective discount factor,
and the utility function is assumed to display a constant coefficient of relative risk
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As in Hatchondo and Martinez (forthcoming), we assume that a bond issued
in period t promises an infinite stream of coupons, which decreases at a constant
rate δ. In particular, a bond issued in period t promises to pay one unit of the good
in period t+ 1 and (1− δ)s−1 units in period t+ s, with s ≥ 2.
Each period, the government makes two decisions. First, it decides whether
to default. Second, it chooses the number of bonds that it purchases or issues in the
current period.
As in previous studies of sovereign default, the cost of defaulting is not a func-
tion of the size of the default. Thus, as in Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2008),
Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011), and Hatchondo and Martinez (forthcoming), when
the government defaults, it does so on all current and future debt obligations. This
is consistent with the behavior of defaulting governments in reality. As mentioned
in the introduction, sovereign debt contracts often contain acceleration and cross-
default clauses. These clauses imply that after a default event, future debt obliga-
tions become current.8 Following previous studies, we also assume that the recovery
rate for debt in default is zero.
Lenders are risk neutral and assign the value e−r to payoffs received in the next
period. Bonds are priced in a competitive market inhabited by a large number of
8The type of acceleration clauses depend on the details of each bond contract and on the
jurisdiction under which the bond was issued (see IMF (2002a)). For instance, in some cases it
is necessary that creditors holding a minimum percentage of the value of the bond issue request
their debt to be accelerated for their future claims to become due and payable. In other cases, no
such qualified majority is needed.
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identical lenders, which implies that bond prices are pinned down by a zero expected
profit condition.
When the government defaults, it faces an income loss of φ (y) in the default
period. In Section 3.4.3 we show that our findings are robust to assuming that
the government is excluded from capital markets after a default episode.9 Following
Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011), we assume a quadratic loss function φ (y) = d0y+
d1y
2.
The government cannot commit to future default and borrowing decisions.
Thus, one may interpret this environment as a game in which the government making
the default and borrowing decisions in period t is a player who takes as given the
default and borrowing strategies of other players (governments) who will decide
after t. We focus on Markov Perfect Equilibrium. That is, we assume that in each
period, the government’s equilibrium default and borrowing strategies depend only
on payoff-relevant state variables. As discussed by Krusell and Smith (2003), there
may be multiple Markov perfect equilibria in infinite-horizon economies. In order to
avoid this problem, we solve for the equilibrium of the finite-horizon version of our
economy, and we increase the number of periods of the finite-horizon economy until
value functions and bond prices for the first and second periods of this economy are
sufficiently close. We then use the first-period equilibrium functions as the infinite-
horizon-economy equilibrium functions.
9Hatchondo et al. (2007) solve a baseline model of sovereign default with and without the
exclusion punishment and show that eliminating this punishment only affects significantly the
debt level generated by the model.
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3.2.2 Recursive formulation of the baseline framework
Let b denote the number of outstanding coupon claims at the beginning of
the current period, and b′ denote the number of outstanding coupon claims at the
beginning of the next period. A negative value of b implies that the government
was a net issuer of bonds in the past. Let d denote the current-period default
decision. We assume that d = 1 if the government defaulted in the current period
and d = 0 if it did not. The number of bonds issued by the government is given
by − [b′ − (1− d)(1− δ)b]. Let V denote the government’s value function at the
beginning of a period, that is, before the default decision is made. Let Ṽ denote its
value function after the default decision has been made. Let F denote the conditional
cumulative distribution function of next-period endowment y′. For any bond price
function q the function V satisfies the following functional equation:
V (b, y) = max
dε{0,1}
{dṼ (1, b, y) + (1− d)Ṽ (0, b, y)}, (3.1)
where
Ṽ (d, b, y) = max
b′≤0
{
u (c) + β
∫




c = y − dφ (y) + (1− d)b− q(b′, y) [b′ − (1− d)(1− δ)b] . (3.3)
The bond price is given by the following functional equation:
q(b′, y) =
∫
e−r [1− h (b′, y′)]F (dy′ | y)
+ (1− δ)
∫
e−r [1− h (b′, y′)] q(g(h(b′, y′), b′, y′), y′)F (dy′ | y) ,(3.4)
63
where h and g denote the future default and borrowing rules that lenders expect the
government to follow.If the government defaults (does not default), h = 1 (h = 0).
The function g determines the number of coupons that will mature next period.
The first term in the right-hand side of equation (3.4) equals the expected value
of the next-period coupon payment promised in a bond. The second term in the
right-hand side of equation (3.4) equals the expected value of all other future coupon
payments, which is summarized by the expected price at which the bond could be
sold in the next period.
Equations (3.1)-(3.4) illustrate that the government finds its optimal current
default and borrowing decisions taking as given its future default and borrowing
decision rules h and g. In equilibrium, the optimal default and borrowing rules that
solve problems (3.1) and (3.2) must be equal to h and g for all possible values of
the state variables.
Definition 3 A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is characterized by
1. a set of value functions Ṽ and V ,
2. a default rule h and a borrowing rule g,
3. a bond price function q,
such that:
(a) given h and g, V and Ṽ satisfy equations (3.1) and (3.2) when the govern-
ment can trade bonds at q;
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(b) given h and g, the bond price function q is given by equation (3.4); and
(c) the default rule h and borrowing rule g solve the dynamic programming
problem defined by equations (3.1) and (3.2) when the government can trade bonds
at q.
3.2.3 A framework without debt dilution
In this section, we propose a modification to the model presented in Section
3.2.1 that will allow us to study an economy without debt dilution and, in turn,
to measure the effects of debt dilution. We eliminate debt dilution—caused by
borrowing decisions—by introducing a borrowing-contingent debt covenant. The
covenant specifies that if the sovereign borrows, it has to pay to the holder of
each previously-issued bond the difference between the counterfactual bond price
one would have observed absent new borrowing and the observed bond market
price.10 This covenant eliminates debt dilution by making the value of each bond
independent from future borrowing decisions.
We assume that a default on borrowing-contingent payments triggers accel-
eration and cross-default clauses that make all the government’s debt obligations
become current: if the government selectively defaults on borrowing-contingent
payments, it has to cancel all current and future debt obligations, discounting fu-
10To be precise, these payment obligations do not only depend on the borrowing decision (how
many bonds are issued in the current period). They also depend on the current income realization
and the debt level, given that the counterfactual bond price one would have observed absent new
borrowing requires knowledge of the income and debt level, and of the bond price function. While
this price is easy to compute in our simulations, it would be difficult to determine in reality. In
Section 4.4 we show that most benefits from eliminating dilution can be obtained with borrowing-
contingent payments that do not depend on this counterfactual price.
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ture debt obligations at the risk-free rate. Consequently, selectively defaulting on
borrowing-contingent payments cannot be better than buying back all government
debt. Therefore, the next subsection presents the recursive formulation of the frame-
work with borrowing-contingent payments without giving the government the option
to selectively default on borrowing-contingent payments (but giving the government
the option to buy back its debt).
3.2.4 Recursive formulation of the framework without debt dilution
As before, let q denote the price function of sovereign bonds. Let b̃ ≡ (1−δ)b <
0 denote the interim number of next-period coupon obligations. As in Section 3.2.1,
when the government wants to buy back its bonds, it does so at the secondary-market
price. If the government issues b̃− b′ > 0 bonds, borrowing-contingent payments are
given by −b̃[q(b̃, y)− q(b′, y)]. Suppose the bond price is higher when the debt level
is lower because the default probability is increasing with respect to the debt level
(as is always the case for the parameterizations we study). The equilibrium bond
price is then given by
q(b′, y) =
∫
e−r [1− h (b′, y′)]F (dy′ | y)
+ (1− δ)
∫
e−r [1− h (b′, y′)] max
{
0, q(b̃′, y′)− q(g(h(b′, y′), b′, y′), y′)
}
F (dy′ | y)
+ (1− δ)
∫
e−r [1− h (b′, y′)] q(g(h(b′, y′), b′, y′), y′)F (dy′ | y) . (3.5)
The first term of the right-hand side of equation (3.5) represents the expected value
of the next-period coupon payment. The second term represents the expected value
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of borrowing-contingent payments. The third term represents the expected value
of a bond at the end of next period—after the lender received the coupon and
borrowing-contingent payments. Note that, because of the borrowing-contingent
payments, the future value of a lender’s investment may be affected by the income
shock, a debt buyback, and a default, but not by new borrowing. Thus, there is no
debt dilution in this framework.
The government’s budget constraint reads
c = y − dφ (y) + (1− d)b+ q(b′, y)(b̃− b′) + b̃max{0, q(b̃, y)− q(b′, y)}. (3.6)
The last term of the right-hand side of equation (3.6) represents the government’s
borrowing-contingent payment. After replacing equations (3.3) and (3.4) by equa-
tions (3.5) and (3.6) in the dynamic programming problem described in Section
3.2.2, we obtain the problem without debt dilution.
3.3 Calibration
Table 3.1 presents the calibration. We assume that the representative agent in
the sovereign economy has a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2, which is within
the range of accepted values in studies of business cycles. A period in the model
refers to a quarter. The risk-free interest rate is set equal to 1%. The parameter
values that govern the endowment process are chosen so as to mimic the behavior
of GDP in Argentina from the fourth quarter of 1993 to the third quarter of 2001,
as in Hatchondo et al. (forthcoming). The parameterization of the output process is
similar to the parameterization used in other studies that consider a longer sample
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Borrower’s risk aversion γ 2
Interest rate r 1%
Output autocorrelation coefficient ρ 0.9
Standard deviation of innovations σε 2.7%
Mean log output µ (-1/2)σ2ε
Duration δ 0.0341
Discount factor β 0.969
Default cost d0 -0.69
Default cost d1 1.01
Risk premium α 4
Table 3.1: Parameter values.
period (see, for instance, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006)).
With δ = 3.41%, bonds have an average duration of 4.19 years in the sim-
ulations of the baseline model.11 Cruces et al. (2002) report that the average du-
ration of Argentinean bonds included in the EMBI index was 4.13 years in 2000.
This duration is not significantly different from what is observed in other emerging
economies. Using a sample of 27 emerging economies, Cruces et al. (2002) find an
average duration of 4.77 years, with a standard deviation of 1.52.
We calibrate the discount factor and the output cost (two parameter values)
to target three moments: a mean spread—i.e., the difference between the sovereign
bond yield and the risk-free interest rate—of 7.4, a standard deviation of the spread
of 2.5, and a mean debt level of 28% of the mean quarterly output in the pre-default






where r∗ denotes the constant per-period yield delivered by the bond.
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samples of our simulations (the exact definition of these samples is presented in
Section 4.1).12 The targets for the spread distribution are taken from the spread
behavior in Argentina before its 2001 default (see Table 3.2). Regarding the debt
level, for the period we study, Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011) target a mean level
of unsecured sovereign debt of 70% of quarterly output. Since our model is a model
of external debt and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) estimate that 60% of the
debt Argentina defaulted on was held by residents, we choose to target a mean debt
level that is roughly 40% of the value targeted by Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011).
In Section 3.4.3 we show that our findings are robust to targeting a higher debt
level.
3.4 Results
As in Hatchondo et al. (2006), we solve the models numerically using value
function iteration and interpolation.13 First, we show that debt dilution accounts
for most of the default risk in the benchmark economy. Second, we present the
welfare gains from eliminating dilution. Third, we discuss the robustness of our
measurement of the effects of debt dilution. Fourth, we show that most gains from
eliminating dilution can be obtained with simpler borrowing-contingent payment
schemes that may be easier to implement. Fifth, we compare long-duration debt
12The discount factor value we obtain is relatively low but higher than the ones assumed in
previous studies (for instance, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) assume β = 0.8). Low discount factors
may be a result of political polarization in emerging economies (see Amador (2003) and Cuadra
and Sapriza (2008)).
13We use linear interpolation for endowment levels and spline interpolation for asset positions.
The algorithm finds two value functions, Ṽ (1, ·, ·) and Ṽ (0, ·, ·). Convergence in the equilibrium
price function q is also assured.
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with borrowing-contingent payments to one-period debt. Finally, we compare the
allocation without dilution with the allocation that the government could attain if
it could trade a full range of one-period state contingent bonds.
3.4.1 Dilution and default risk
This subsection measures the effects of debt dilution. In order to do so, it
presents simulation results from the models with and without debt dilution. Table
3.2 reports moments in the data and in our simulations.14 As in previous studies,
we report results computed for pre-default simulation samples. The exception is
the default frequency, which we compute using all simulation periods. We simulate
the model for a number of periods that allows us to extract 500 samples of 32
consecutive periods before a default. We focus on samples of 32 periods because
we compare the artificial data generated by the model with Argentine data from
the fourth quarter of 1993 to the third quarter of 2001.15 In order to facilitate the
comparison of simulation results with the data, we only consider simulation sample
paths in which the last default was declared at least two periods before the beginning
of each sample.
The moments reported in Table 3.2 are chosen so as to illustrate the ability of
the model to replicate distinctive business cycle properties of emerging economies.
14The data for output and consumption were obtained from the Argentine Finance Ministry.
The spread before the first quarter of 1998 is taken from Neumeyer and Perri (2005), and from the
EMBI Global after that.
15The qualitative features of this data are also observed in other sample periods and in other
emerging markets (see, for example, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), Alvarez-Parra et al. (2011), Boz
et al. (2008), Neumeyer and Perri (2005), and Uribe and Yue (2006)). The only exception is that in
the data we consider, the volatility of consumption is slightly lower than the volatility of income,
while emerging market economies tend to display a higher volatility of consumption relative to
income.
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Data Dilution No dilution
Defaults per 100 years 5.59 0.91
Mean debt market value 0.21 0.20
Mean debt face value 0.28 0.30 0.21
E(Rs) 7.44 7.21 0.95
σ (Rs) 2.51 2.54 0.68
σ(ỹ) 3.17 2.97 3.28
σ(c̃)/σ(ỹ) 0.94 1.03 1.10
ρ (c̃, ỹ) 0.97 1.00 0.99
ρ (Rs, ỹ) -0.65 -0.81 -0.63
Table 3.2: Business cycle statistics. The second column is computed using data from
Argentina from 1993 to 2001. Other columns report the mean of the value of each moment
in 500 simulation samples. Each sample consists of 32 periods before a default episode.
These economies feature a high, volatile, and countercyclical interest rate, and high
consumption volatility. To compute the quarterly interest rate spread we first cal-
culate the yield that makes the present value of future payments promised in a
bond—which for the no-dilution case includes borrowing-contingent payments—
equal to the bond price. Then, we calculate the quarterly spread as the difference
between this yield and the risk-free rate. The annualized spread (Rs) is four times
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the quarterly spread.16
In Table 3.2, the logarithm of income and consumption are denoted by ỹ and
c̃, respectively. The standard deviation of x is denoted by σ (x) and is reported
in percentage terms. The coefficient of correlation between x and z is denoted by
ρ (x, z). Moments are computed using detrended series. Trends are computed using
the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1, 600. Table 3.2 also
reports the mean debt market value (computed as the mean b divided by δ+r∗, where
r∗ is the mean equilibrium interest rate) and the mean debt face value (computed
as the mean b divided by δ + r).
Table 3.2 shows that the baseline model with dilution matches the data rea-
sonably well. As in the data, in the simulations of the baseline model consumption
and income are highly correlated, and the consumption volatility is higher than
the income volatility. The model also approximates reasonably well the moments
used as targets (the mean debt level, and the mean and standard deviation of the
spread). Estimating the default probability in the data is difficult. Using a sample
of 68 countries between 1970 and 2010, Cruces and Trebesch (2011) find a frequency
16In the economy without dilution, let
C(b, y) = max {q(b(1− δ)(1− h(b, y)), y)− q(g(h(b, y), b, y), y), 0}
denote the per-bond borrowing-contingent payment when the initial state is given by the vector
(b, y). Let
qDF (b′, y; i) = e−i
∫ [
1 + C(b′, y′) + (1− δ)qDF (g(h(b′, y′), b′, y′), y′; i)
]
F (dy′ | y)
denote the price of a default-free bond that pays the coupon and C every period, where i denotes
the constant rate at which future payments are discounted. In state (b, y), the yield of a defaultable
bond is defined as the rate i∗ that satisfies
qDF (g(h(b, y), b, y), y, i∗) = q(g(h(b, y), b, y), y).
The annualized interest rate spread is therefore defined as Rs = 4(i
∗ − r).
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of 6.6 defaults every 100 years. Arellano (2008) targets a frequency of 3 defaults
per 100 years because that is the number of defaults observed in Argentina during
the last 100 years. The default frequency in our benchmark simulation is between
those numbers. In Section 3.4.3, we show that, when the risk aversion of lenders is
calibrated to generate a yearly default frequency of three defaults per 100 years, the
effects of debt dilution are similar to the ones reported using our baseline calibration.
What are the quantitative effects of debt dilution? Table 3.2 shows that debt
dilution accounts for 84% of the default risk in the simulations of the baseline model.
The number of defaults per 100 years decreases from 5.59 in the baseline to 0.91 in
the model without debt dilution. Debt dilution also accounts for 87% of the spread
paid by the sovereign. The standard deviation of the spread decreases from 2.54
with debt dilution to 0.68 without debt dilution. The mean face value of outstanding
bonds declines 32%. Most of this decline is explained by the lower interest rate in
the simulations of the model without debt dilution: The mean market value of
outstanding bonds decreases only by 9%.
In order to shed light on how eliminating debt dilution affects the government’s
optimal decisions it is illustrative to consider its first-order conditions. We use
fj(x1, ..., xn) to denote the first-order derivative of the function f with respect to the
argument xj. The first-order condition in the benchmark economy (with dilution)
is given by
u1(c)q
Dil(b′, y) = β
∫
V Dil1 (b
′, y′)F (dy′ | y)− u1(c)qDil1 (b′, y)[b′ − (1− d)b̃], (3.7)
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where the superindex Dil denotes variables in the economy with dilution. The
left-hand side of equation (3.7) represents the marginal benefit of borrowing. By
issuing one extra bond today, the government can increase current consumption by
qDil(b′, y) units. The right-hand side of equation (3.7) represents the marginal cost
of borrowing. The first term in the right-hand side represents the future cost of bor-
rowing: by borrowing more, the government decreases expected future consumption.
The second term in the right-hand side represents the current cost of borrowing: by
borrowing more, the government decreases the issuance price of every bond it issues
in the current period, which in turn decreases current consumption.
Assuming that the zero-profit bond price is decreasing in the debt level (as we
find it is the case for the parameterizations we study) and the government chooses
to borrow (b′ < b̃), the first-order condition in the economy without dilution is given
by
u1(c)q
No dil(b′, y) = β
∫
V No dil1 (b
′, y′)F (dy′ | y)− u1(c)qNo dil1 (b′, y)b′, (3.8)
where the superindex No dil is used to denote variables in the economy with
no dilution.
The comparison of equations (3.7) and (3.8) shows how our modification to
the baseline model affects the tradeoffs faced by the government when it issues debt.
In equation (3.7), the current cost of borrowing depends on the new issuances: The
government only internalizes as a cost the decline in the value of bonds issued in
the current period. It does not internalize as a cost the decrease in the value of
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the debt issued in previous periods. In contrast, equation (3.8) shows that with
our modification to the baseline model, the current cost of borrowing depends on
the entire debt stock at the end of the period. That is, the government chooses
its issuance level internalizing the dilution in the value of debt issued in previous
periods.
Equation (3.8) illustrates the tradeoffs faced by the government for a given
bond price. But the change in the government’s tradeoffs also affect the bond price
schedule the government faces when issuing debt. We illustrate that in Figure 3.1.
The figure presents the spread demanded by lenders as a function of the face value
of next-period debt. The figure also presents the combination of spread levels and
next-period debt chosen by the government when its initial debt level is the average
level in the simulations of each case considered in the graph.
Figure 3.1 shows that a shift in the government’s choice set plays an important
role in accounting for the reduction in spreads implied by the elimination of debt
dilution: Even for the same debt levels, spread levels are higher in the benchmark
than in the no-dilution model. For the equilibrium debt levels without dilution,
equilibrium spread levels would be about 400 basis points higher in the economy with
dilution. In the model without dilution, borrowing-contingent payments weaken the
governments incentives to issue debt and thus imply lower future issuance levels.
For any debt level, the expectation of lower future issuance levels implies a lower
default probability. This in turn allows the government to pay a lower interest rate.
Figure 3.1 also helps us understand why consumption volatility is higher in the
























Figure 3.1: Menu of combinations of spreads and next-period debt levels ( b
′
δ+r ) from
which the government can choose. The left panel corresponds to the baseline case. The
right panel corresponds to the case without debt dilution. In each of these two cases, solid
dots illustrate the optimal decision of a government that inherits a debt level equal to the
average debt observed in our simulations for that case. Vertical lines mark the govern-
ment’s debt level before its issuance decision. The low (high) value of y corresponds to
an endowment realization that is one standard deviation below (above) the unconditional
mean.
levels tend to be lower in the economy without dilution than in the benchmark with
dilution (in the figure, issuance levels are represented by the horizontal distance
between the dark dots and the vertical solid line).17 Thus, the government is more
effective in mitigating the effects of low income realizations on consumption in the
benchmark with dilution.
17Notice that, for the same debt level, the spread curves in Figure 3.1 are steeper when income is
lower. This implies that in the economy without dilution, for the same issuance level, borrowing-
contingent payments would be larger when income is lower.
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3.4.2 Welfare gains from eliminating dilution
We next show that it is welfare enhancing to implement the borrowing-contingent
payments that eliminate debt dilution. Eliminating dilution reduces the frequency of
defaults, and with that it reduces the deadweight losses caused by defaults. We mea-
sure welfare gains as the constant proportional change in consumption that would
leave a consumer indifferent between continuing living in the benchmark economy
with dilution and moving to an economy without dilution. The welfare gain of
moving from the benchmark economy to the economy without dilution is given by
(




Figure 3.2 presents welfare gains from implementing the borrowing-contingent
payments that eliminate dilution. The figure considers two initial debt levels: zero,
and the mean debt level in the simulations of the economy with dilution. The figure
shows that for both cases there are positive welfare gains from eliminating dilution.
In order to eliminate dilution in an economy with positive debt levels, the
government promises borrowing-contingent payments to holders of existing debt.
This is costly for the government and explains why in Figure 3.2 welfare gains from
eliminating dilution are lower when there is initial debt (except for lower income
levels for which the government chooses to default).18
18Welfare gains are larger in a default period (when the government writes off all debt liabilities)
than when the government enters the period without debt. After a default, the government wants
to smooth out the income cost of defaulting. Thus, in a default period, the government has
stronger incentives to borrow than when it enters the period without debt. This explains why the
improvement in borrowing terms implied by the elimination of dilution is more valuable in default


















Figure 3.2: Consumption compensation (in percentage terms) that makes domestic agents
indifferent between living in an economy with or without dilution. The figure was con-
structed assuming that the initial debt level is equal to zero or to the mean debt level in
the simulations of the economy with dilution. A positive number means that agents prefer
the economy without dilution.
Figure 3.2 also presents welfare gains from the case in which the government
captures existing bondholders’ capital gains from the introduction of borrowing-
contingent payments that eliminate debt dilution. We assume the government
captures these gains through a debt exchange: The government makes a take-it-
or-leave-it debt buyback offer with the promise that these borrowing-contingent
payments will be implemented only if this offer is accepted. Thus, the government
offers bondholders to buy back previously issued bonds at the price that would have
been observed if borrowing-contingent payments were never implemented. That
price is lower than the no-dilution price at which the government would be able to
issue debt after implementing borrowing-contingent payments. By assuming that
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the government makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, we focus on the extreme case in
which it reaps all capital gains.19 The case in which borrowing-contingent payments
are introduced without a debt exchange constitutes the other extreme case in which
bondholders enjoy all these gains.
It should be mentioned that one may want to take our measure of the welfare
gain with a grain of salt. In particular, one could argue that our measure is too low.
Since there is no production in our setup, we cannot capture productivity gains from
reducing the level and volatility of interest rates.20 Several studies find evidence of a
significant effect of interest rates on productivity (through the allocation of factors of
production), and of a significant role of interest rate fluctuations in the amplification
of shocks (see, for example, Mendoza and Yue (2008), Neumeyer and Perri (2005),
and Uribe and Yue (2006)). Furthermore, the welfare gain is increasing in the level
of debt, and we chose to calibrate our model to a low debt level to resemble the level
of sovereign defaultable debt held by foreigners. In the next subsection we present
a calibration with a higher debt level and show that eliminating dilution results in
a larger welfare gain.
3.4.3 Robustness
In this subsection, we show that our finding of a strong effect of debt dilution
on sovereign default risk is robust to changes in the benchmark economy we study.
We focus on three changes to our benchmark. First, we modify the cost of defaulting
19It is also assumed that there are no output costs triggered by that debt exchange.
20The development of a sovereign default framework that accommodates effects of interest rates
on factors allocation is the subject of ongoing research (see, for example, Mendoza and Yue (forth-
coming) and Sosa-Padilla (2011)).
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to allow for a higher debt stock. Second, we assume that lenders are risk averse.
Third, we introduce sudden-stop shocks into the model (while we still assume risk-
averse lenders). For all cases, we show that eliminating dilution leads to a significant
reduction of the default frequency and increases welfare.
In order to present a case with higher debt levels, we assume a larger cost
of defaulting. A defaulting economy is banned from international capital markets
for a stochastic number of periods and it loses a fraction of its output in every
period it remains excluded. The probability of reentry to capital markets is constant
over time. This is the same cost of defaulting considered in most previous studies
of sovereign default (e.g., Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008)). We
assume that the probability of reentry equals 0.282, which is the value used by
Arellano (2008). The only parameters that change compared to the benchmark
parameterization are the ones that determine the output loss after a default. We set
d0 = −0.7043 and d1 = 0.9236. This calibration implies a debt level of 78 percent
of quarterly output, a value slightly higher than the one targeted by Chatterjee and
Eyigungor (2011).
We introduce risk premium as Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2008). We as-
sume that the price of sovereign bonds satisfies a no arbitrage condition with stochas-
tic discount factor M(y′, y) = e−r−αε
′−0.5α2σ2ε . Several studies document that the
risk premium is an important component of sovereign spreads and that a significant
fraction of the spread volatility in the data is accounted for by the volatility in the
risk premium (see, for example, Borri and Verdelhan (2009), Broner et al. (2007),
Longstaff et al. (2011), and González-Rozada and Levy Yeyati (2008)).
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The discount factor M(y′, y) is a special case of the discrete-time version of
the Vasicek one-factor model of the term structure (see Vasicek (1977) and Backus
et al. (1998)). With our formulation, the risk premium is determined by the income
shock in the borrowing economy. The advantage of our formulation is that it avoids
introducing additional state variables to the model. However, it may be more natural
to assume that the lenders’ valuation of future payments is not perfectly correlated
with the sovereign’s income.
Our third robustness exercise shows that our measurement of the quantitative
effect of dilution on default risk is robust to assuming that there is a shock to the
cost of borrowing that is not perfectly correlated with the sovereign’s income. To
this end, we introduce sudden-stop shocks. These shocks have received considerable
attention in the international macroeconomics literature (see Durdu et al. (2009) and
the references therein) but have been mostly ignored in the quantitative sovereign
default literature (Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011) is a notable exception). We
add a shock s such that when s = 1 (s = 0) the government can (cannot) issue
debt—the government can always buy back previously issued debt. We denote by
π1 (π0) the probability of st+1 = st conditional on st = 1 (st = 0). Thus, the value
functions with sudden stops are given by
V (b, y, s) = max
dε{0,1}
{dṼ (1, b, y, s) + (1− d)Ṽ (0, b, y, s)},
Ṽ (d, b, y, 1) = max
b′≤0
{
u (c) + β
∫
[π1V (b





Ṽ (d, b, y, 0) = max
b(1−δ)≤b′≤0
{
u (c) + β
∫
[π0V (b
′, y′, 0) + (1− π0)V (b′, y′, 1)]F (dy′ | y)
}
.
We calibrate π1 and π0 assuming that there is a 5.5% unconditional probability of
observing s = 0 and sudden-stop periods last for one year on average (using annual
data for a sample of developing countries from 1980 to 2003, Eichengreen et al.
(2008) estimate a 5.5% probability of observing a sudden stop).
Table 3.3 shows that there is a strong effect of debt dilution on sovereign de-
fault risk in the three economies studied in this subsection. The effects of dilution
on other variables are also very similar across the different exercises. The exception
is the debt level. When the government is excluded from capital markets after a
default, the market value of debt is higher in the economy without dilution. The
better borrowing terms that the government receives in the economy without dilu-
tion increases the value of having access to debt markets and, therefore, it makes
defaulting more costly in that case. Eliminating dilution is also beneficial for welfare
in all the cases studies.
3.4.4 Alternative borrowing-contingent payments
Implementing the borrowing-contingent payments that eliminate dilution would
require knowledge of the fundamentals that determine bond prices (income and debt
in the model) and the mapping from fundamentals onto bond prices. In this section,
we study the effects of two simpler debt covenants.
We first study the case in which borrowing-contingent payments are a prede-
82
Higher debt Risk-averse lenders Sudden Stops
Dilution No dilution Dilution No dilution Dilution No dilution
Defaults per 100 years 4.52 1.02 3.10 0.42 5.07 0.86
Mean debt market value 0.55 0.56 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.19
Mean debt face value 0.78 0.59 0.28 0.19 0.32 0.20
E(Rs) 7.12 1.11 7.04 0.99 7.64 0.52
σ (Rs) 2.72 0.75 2.19 0.71 3.05 0.65
σ(y) 2.98 3.22 2.03 3.36 3.07 3.25
σ(c)/σ(y) 1.08 1.26 1.04 1.08 1.03 1.11
ρ (c, y) 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99
ρ (Rs, y) -0.79 -0.65 -0.82 -0.63 -0.80 -0.62
Welfare gain (% of cons.) 0.33 0.13 0.12
Table 3.3: Robustness exercises. The welfare gain corresponds to the average gain for
the case of zero debt.
termined fixed share of borrowing revenues per unit of outstanding debt. We search
for the optimal share of borrowing revenues the government should promise to exist-
ing creditors. We find that this share is such that on average the government pays
to holders of debt issued in previous periods 36% of its issuance revenues.21
Table 3.4 presents simulation results for the economy with the fixed-share
borrowing-contingent payments. The table shows these payments allow the govern-
ment to achieve 83% of the decline in the default frequency and 69% of the ex-ante
welfare gain it achieves with the borrowing-contingent payments that eliminate di-
lution.
The main difference between fixed-share borrowing-contingent payments and
21It should be mentioned that promising higher borrowing-contingent payments is not necessarily
costly for the government because it allows the government to sell bonds at a higher price.
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Dilution No dilution Fixed share Linear
Defaults per 100 years 5.59 0.91 1.71 0.81
Mean debt market value 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.19
Mean debt face value 0.30 0.21 0.20 0.20
E(Rs) 7.21 0.95 2.01 0.79
σ (Rs) 2.54 0.68 1.31 0.66
σ(y) 2.97 3.27 3.05 3.28
σ(c)/σ(y) 1.03 1.10 0.96 1.10
ρ (c, y) 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99
ρ (Rs, y) -0.81 -0.63 -0.64 -0.61
Welfare gain (% of cons.) 0.13 0.09 0.13
Table 3.4: Simulation results for different borrowing-contingent payments. The welfare
gain corresponds to the average gain for the case of zero debt.
the borrowing-contingent payments that eliminate dilution is that the former are
an increasing function of the post-issuance bond price q(b′, y) while the latter are a
decreasing function of q(b′, y). Next, we study the effects of introducing borrowing-
contingent payments that are a decreasing function of the post-issuance bond price
(but do not depend on the bond price that would have been observed in the absence
of borrowing). In particular, we assume that the covenant specifies that if the gov-
ernment issues debt in the current period, it has to pay A− q(b′, y) per bond issued
in previous periods. We search for the optimal value of A and find that this value is
1.75% higher than the price of a risk-free bond without borrowing-contingent pay-
ments. Table 3.4 shows that this optimal borrowing-contingent function would allow
the government to achieve the same welfare gain as with the borrowing-contingent
payments that eliminate dilution, with a slightly lower default frequency. In sum-
mary, our findings indicate that simple borrowing-contingent payments could also
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reduce default risk significantly and be welfare enhancing.
3.4.5 Borrowing-contingent payments vs. one-period bonds
In this subsection, we show that in general one cannot measure the effects
of debt dilution by comparing equilibria with long-duration and one-period bonds.
With one-period bonds, when the government issues debt, the outstanding debt
level is zero (either because the government honored its debt at the beginning of the
period or because it defaulted on it) and, thus, the government cannot dilute the
value of debt issued in previous periods. But with one-period bonds the government
has to pay back its entire debt stock in every period, which increases its exposure
to rollover risk.
Table 3.5 presents simulation results for two models without dilution: Our
model with the borrowing-contingent payments that eliminate dilution, and a one-
period bond model (i.e., a model with δ = 1). The table presents results for both the
baseline and the sudden-stop versions of the model. Table 3.5 shows that simulation
results obtained with one-period bonds differ from those obtained with borrowing-
contingent payments. Because one-period bonds may increase the government’s
exposure to rollover risk, differences in results are wider for the sudden-stop model,
for which rollover risk is more significant. With sudden stops, lower default prob-
abilities with one-period bonds are not only the result of the elimination of debt




Borrowing-cont. One-period Borrowing-cont. One-period
Defaults per 100 years 0.91 0.34 0.86 0.03
Mean debt (market value) 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.08
Mean debt (face value) 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.08
E(Rs) 0.95 0.44 0.52 0.15
σ (Rs) 0.68 0.45 0.65 0.27
σ(y) 3.28 3.10 3.25 3.22
σ(c)/σ(y) 1.10 1.23 1.11 1.28
ρ (c, y) 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.80
ρ (Rs, y) -0.63 -0.73 -0.62 -0.41
Welfare gain (% of cons.) 0.13 0.13 0.12 -0.10
Table 3.5: Business cycle statistics without debt dilution. The welfare gain corresponds
to the average gain for the case of zero debt.
In terms of welfare, when the government is subject to sudden-stop shocks
and rollover risk is significant, replacing long-duration bonds by one-period bonds
results in welfare losses. The ex-ante welfare loss from issuing one-period bonds
instead of long-duration bonds is equivalent to a permanent consumption decline of
0.1%. In contrast, the ex-ante welfare gain from introducing borrowing-contingent
payments is equivalent to a permanent consumption increase of 0.12%.
3.4.6 Borrowing-contingent payments vs. one-period state-contingent
claims
Equation (3.6) makes clear that the borrowing-contingent payments needed
to eliminate dilution are state-contingent. In this subsection, we explore how those
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borrowing-contingent payments perform against the best possible case with state-
contingent one-period claims. It would be best for the government to transfer re-
sources across periods using contracts with payoffs that are conditional on the past
history of state realizations. For tractability reasons, in this subsection we consider
a market structure in which the government can issue one-period Arrow-Debreu
securities that pay off conditional on the next-period domestic income realization.
The government is subject to the same limited liability constraint that is present in
the benchmark economy.22
We assume that the government chooses how much it promises to pay next
period for each realization of next-period income y′ (payments can be negative). Let
b′(y′) denote such government’s promise. The government is subject to the same cost
of defaulting that is present in the benchmark economy. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the government only promises payments b′(y′) for which it would
not choose to default. Lenders would not pay for a government’s promise b′(y′) that
the government would default on.
Let W̃ (d, b, y) denote the value function of a government that has chosen the
default decision d after starting the period with debt b and income y. For any b0 and
b1, W̃ (1, b0, y) = W̃ (1, b1, y). Thus, since W̃ (0, b, y) is decreasing in b, for any income
level y, there exists a debt level b
¯
(y′) such that the government defaults if and only
if its debt level is higher than −b
¯
(y′). For any y, b
¯
(y) satisfies W̃ (0, b
¯
(y), y) =
22Issuing long-term debt allows the government to bring resources forward from future periods,
not only from the subsequent period. That is not an option in the economy with one-period
Arrow-Debreu securities. Clearly, this limitation is not an issue in the absence of the limited
liability constraint. But it can dampen the welfare gain from issuing Arrow-Debreu securities in





W̃ (d, b, y) = max
b′(y′)
{
u (c) + β
∫
W (b′, y′)F (dy′ | y)
}
s.t. c = y − dφ (y) + (1− d)b− e−r
∫
b′(y′)F (dy′ | y)
b′(y′) ≥ b
¯
(y′) for all y′,
and
W (b, y) = max
dε{0,1}
{dW̃ (1, b, y) + (1− d)W̃ (0, b, y)}.
Table 3.6 summarizes simulation results in the benchmark, and in the economies
with the borrowing-contingent payments that eliminate dilution, and with state-
contingent claims. Since there are no defaults with state-contingent claims, we
cannot use the same criterion for selecting samples that we used for economies with
defaults. In order to facilitate the comparison of simulations across economies, for
the economy with state-contingent claims we use the same 500 samples of 32 periods
used to compute the simulations in the benchmark economy (income shocks are the
same, though the initial debt levels may differ).
Table 3.6 shows that the average ex-ante welfare gain from moving to an econ-
omy with state-contingent claims amounts to a permanent increase in consump-
tion of 0.53%. There are three sources of welfare gains from using state-contingent
claims. First, issuing state-contingent claims allows the government to avoid de-
faults. Second, when borrowing, the government is able to obtain more resources
with state-contingent claims (as reflected in the higher market value of its debt).
Third, the consumption process is more disentangled from the income process in
the economy with state-contingent claims (as reflected in the lower consumption
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Benchmark No dilution State-contingent claims
Defaults per 100 years 5.59 0.91 0
Mean debt market value 0.21 0.20 0.30
Mean debt face value 0.30 0.21 0.30
σ(y) 2.97 3.28 2.97
σ(c)/σ(y) 1.03 1.10 0.67
ρ (c, y) 1.00 0.99 0.87
Welfare gain (% of cons.) 0.13 0.53
Table 3.6: Business cycle statistics in the benchmark economy and in the economies with
the borrowing-contingent payments that eliminate dilution and with one-period state-
contingent bonds. The welfare gain corresponds to the average gain for the case of zero
debt.
volatility).
Welfare gains from moving to an economy with borrowing-contingent pay-
ments are 25% of those from introducing state-contingent claims. In contrast with
state-contingent claims, borrowing-contingent payments do not eliminate defaults
completely, reduce slightly the market value of the government’s debt, and increase
consumption volatility.
Our stylized framework is likely to overstate the advantages of introducing
state-contingent claims over the introduction of borrowing-contingent payments.
First, identifying the state is much more difficult in the real world than in our
stylized model. In our model income shocks are the only source of uncertainty.
However, Tomz and Wright (2007) argue that other determinants of the sovereigns’
willingness to repay besides aggregate income play an important role in accounting
for sovereign defaults. Identifying the shocks that affect default risk, measuring
these shocks, and writing debt contracts with payments contingent on these shocks
89
may be difficult. Second, writing debt claims contingent on income may suffer from
verifiability and moral hazard issues that are not present in our stylized model. A
government could manipulate the GDP calculation and final GDP data are available
with a significant lag. It has also been argued that debt claims contingent on GDP
may introduce moral hazard problems by weakening the government’s incentives to
implement growth-promoting policies, which improves the likelihood of repayment.23
3.5 Conclusions
We solved a baseline sovereign default framework à la Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) assuming that sovereign bonds contain a debt covenant promising that after
each time the government borrows, it pays to the holder of each bond issued in
previous periods the difference between the bond market price that would have
been observed absent current-period borrowing and the observed market price. This
covenant eliminates debt dilution—caused by borrowing decisions—by making the
value of each bond independent from future borrowing decisions. We measured the
effects of debt dilution by comparing the simulations of this model with the ones
of the baseline model without borrowing-contingent payments. We found that even
without commitment to future repayment policies and without optimally designed
contingent claims, if the sovereign eliminates debt dilution, the default probability
decreases 84%. We also showed that most gains from eliminating dilution can be
obtained with borrowing-contingent payments that depend only on the bond market
23See, for instance, Krugman (1988). These issues could be addressed by indexing debt contracts
to variables that the government cannot control such as commodity prices or trading partners’
growth rates (see for instance Caballero (2002)).
90
price.
Our findings indicate that governments could benefit from committing to lower
future borrowing levels, which governments could achieve through fiscal rules. Elim-
inating debt dilution should be an important motivation for the implementation of
fiscal rules that could reduce significantly the risk of debt crises and the mean and
volatility of interest rates (see Hatchondo et al. (2012)). Fiscal crises are occur-
ring in countries with fiscal rules in part because of the weak enforcement of these
rules. The borrowing-contingent covenants studied in this paper could enhance the
enforcement of fiscal rules by providing incentives for lower future borrowing levels.
Implementing these covenants would necessitate the same strict accounting norms
necessary for the successful implementation of fiscal rules.
As in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011) and Hatchondo and Martinez (forth-
coming), we assume that the government cannot choose the duration of its debt.
Relaxing this assumption could enhance our understanding of the effects of debt di-
lution. It has been argued that the dilution problem may lead to excessive issuances
of short-term debt (e.g., Kletzer (1984)). However, allowing the government to
choose the duration of its debt would increase the computation cost significantly.24
24If one allows the government to choose a different duration of sovereign bonds each period, one
would have to keep track of how many bonds the government has issued of each possible duration
to determine government’s liabilities (Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2008) study a model in which
the government can choose to issue bonds with two possible durations). The computation cost of




In this Appendix we present and solve the model studied in ”Sovereign De-
faults and Banking Crises” (i.e. Chapter 2) with the following modification: the
government has now access to lump-sum taxation. The aim of this appendix is to
highlight that even thought taxation is not distortionary anymore there is still a
meaningful trade-off when taking the default decision.
A.1 Cost vs. Benefits of a Default
As we did in the previous chapters (and as it is usual in the literature of
sovereign defaults) we are going to approach the default decision as an strategic
one. Therefore, the sovereign (i.e. the decision maker) will balance the costs and
benefits of a default and decide to default whenever the benefits exceed the costs.
The costs of a sovereign default were already discussed and analyzed in Chapter
2: a sovereign default generates a credit crunch which in turn creates an output
decline. The benefits of a default have been described as ”reduced taxation” in
Chapter 2: by walking away on its debt the sovereign can afford to reduce the tax
rate that it was charging to households.
The modification in this appendix is that the government now has access only
to a lump-sum tax. With distortive taxation a tax-break after the default has a dual
effect for the households: first, by changing the after-tax wage it alters their labor
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supply decision, second, given that the total revenues collected decrease there is an
”income” effect that benefits households - they simply pay less taxes, and they like
that. In the scenario of lump-sum taxation the first effect disappears but the second
effect remains: a tax-break is still valued by the households (hence it remains being
a ”benefit” of defaulting) because of the income effect just mentioned.
The remainder of this appendix is as follows: section A.2 presents how the
model equations should be modified in order to accommodate for lump-sum taxation,
section A.3 shows the quantitative findings under this modified environment and
makes the case that the main results and intuitions carry through even in absence
of distortionary taxation.
A.2 Modified Model
In this section we present the needed alterations to the model in Chapter 2 in
order to study the case of lump-sum taxation. The very first change to the model
is in the household’s budget constraint. Now it should look as:
ct +m = wtnt − Tt + ΠFt (A.1)
where Tt stands for the lump-sum taxation that is levied in period t. After
this change we immediately need to change the intra-temporal Euler equation that






where the modification consist of the absence of (1 − τt) in the right-hand
side. This is exactly what we mean by taxation being not distortionary: it does not
generate a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure (left-hand side of equation A.2) and the wage rate (right-hand side of
equation A.2).
The last modification to the model equations is in the government budget
constraint. This change is very straight forward and points out that now taxation
is lump-sum:
g + (1− dt)Bt = Tt + (1− dt)Bt+1qt (A.3)
A.3 Quantitative Findings
In this section we will present the quantitative performance of the modified
model. The parametrization/calibration is the same as in Chapter 2. 1
With only the exception of corr(Rs, N) all other moments behave qualitatively
in line with the data (and also in line with the benchmark specification of the model).
1The aim here is to see how the model performs under lump-sum taxation and not to match
moments from the data. If we would attempt the latter, clearly we would need to re-calibrate the
model given that we have changed its structure.
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Data Benchmark Lump-Sum
σ(c)/σ(y) 1.17 1.82 2.86
σ(n)/σ(y) 0.57 0.94 0.57
corr(Rs, y) -0.62 -0.81 -0.29
corr(c, y) 0.97 0.99 0.88
corr(N, y) 0.52 0.99 0.90
corr(Rs, N) -0.58 -0.77 0.02
Mean output drop 9.40% 8.23% 8.92%
Mean credit drop 27.09% 8.17% 19.34%
Default rate 2.56% 1.60% 0.74%
Mean debt/ output 16.5% 16.84% 42.88%
Gov’t Spending/ output 20% 19.75% 17.20%
Mean Exposure Ratio 36% 36.12% 58.75%
Table A.1: Simulated Moments: Data vs. Benchmark model vs. Lump-sum model. Rs
stands for bond’s spread. The data for sovereign spreads is taken from J.P. Morgan’s
EMBI, which represents the difference in yields between an Argentine bond and a US
bond of similar maturity. The spreads generated by the model are the difference between
the the interest rate paid by the government and the one paid by the private sector.
A.3.1 Output and credit dynamics around defaults
In this subsection we document the dynamics of output and credit around de-
faults under the lump-sum taxation framework. The basic message of this subsection
is: nothing changes. The behavior of credit and output in the new specification re-
semble those of the benchmark specification. In other words, the main mechanism
of the paper (a default-induced credit crunch that generates an output decline) goes
through regardless of the taxation instruments available to the government.
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Student Version of MATLAB
Figure A.1: Lump-Sum model: Output around defaults.





























Student Version of MATLAB
Figure A.2: Lump-Sum model: Credit around defaults.
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A.3.2 Sovereign Debt Market
In this subsection we report how the sovereign bonds’ market behaves under
the lump-sum taxation specification. Figures A.3 and A.4 show the default region,
the bond-price schedule, and the equilibrium spreads. Again the message is the
same: regardless of the quantitative differences between the lump-sum taxation and
the distortionary taxation versions, the qualitative behavior is the same.
























Student Version of MATLAB
Figure A.3: Lump-Sum model: d(b, z) and q(b′, z).
A.3.3 Taxation around defaults
Finally we analyze how the taxes move around a default in the lump-sum
version of the model. Contrary to the previous sub-sections we are going to plot
together the labor tax rate (from the distortionary-taxation version of the model)
97












Data (end of period)
Student Version of MATLAB
Figure A.4: Lump-Sum model: Spreads before a default.
and the lump-sum tax in the same graph to more easily see how things change when
we move to a lump-sum taxation environment. Figure A.5 shows this exercise.
The take away from Figure A.5 is very straight-forward: in both cases the
taxes increase in the run-up to the crisis, and then at the moment of default the
actual tax levied is significantly lower than what should have been charged in the
(counter-factual repayment case). Therefore the aforementioned intuition that a
default allows the sovereign to afford a tax break is still valid in the lump-sum
taxation environment.
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tax rate (left axis)
repayment rate
lum sump tax (right axis)
repayment lump sum
Student Version of MATLAB
Figure A.5: Lump-sum taxes vs. Distortionary taxes.
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Appendix B
Data Sources for Chapter 2
This appendix is aimed to provide further details about the sources of data
used in Chapter 2 ”Sovereign Defaults and Banking Crises”.
B.1 Timing of Defaults and Banking Crises
The stylized fact reported in the body of the chapter (i.e. that sovereign
defaults often coincide or precede banking crises) was constructed using the data
provided by Reinhart (2010) which is publicly available at:
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15815
B.2 Banking Sector Exposure to Government Debt
As expressed in the chapter, we follow Kumhof and Tanner (2005) in docu-
menting this fact by looking at the exposure ratio.
Financial Institutions’ net credit to the gov’t
Financial Institutions’ net total assets
The data was taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS).
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B.3 Output and Credit
To construct the output and credit dynamics around defaults we used IMF’s
IFS series of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Private Credit.
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